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I. INTRODUCTION
The word "democracy" stems from the Greek "demos," meaning
"the people."' "The people" supposedly rule in a democracy, but
who are the people? "The people" come divided, by social stratifica-
* Thomas W. Simon is a Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy and Political
Science at the University of Illinois, and Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Baltimore. The author would like to thank Peggy Puckett for providing valuable research
assistance, and Professors Francis Boyle, Frank Michelman, and Ronald Rotunda for reading
earlier drafts and providing comments and encouragement when most needed.
1. The etymology of "demos" follows a circuitous path. "Demos" relates, in part, to
demes, non-tribal political divisions of the electorate devised by Cleithenes in 510-508 B.C.
See J. OBER, MASS AND ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS 68-71 (1989). Historians disagree
over whether demos meant all citizens or the lower class. Id. at 3-17.
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tion, into various groups, some of which, by virtue of this stratifica-
tion, do little or none of the "ruling." Thus, if some individuals set
out to start a democratic society, they must first take into account the
social stratification in their existing society. If they carry the rem-
nants of the old social hierarchy into their new democracy, they risk
the destruction of that democracy. If the concept of "the people" is to
have any meaning, all groups must participate in some fashion. The
alternative is that the "democracy" does not recognize them as
"people."
A democratic system can tolerate some degree of disparity
between individuals (tolerable gaps in income level for example), and
some types of differences among groups of people (good looks for
example). Other types of differences between groups, however, are
antithetical to democracy. This Article will explore group differences
where, due to an individual's membership in a disadvantaged group,
that person's democratic activities are curtailed. The probem of wide
disparity between social groups infects the very core of democracy
because all versions of democracy must presuppose enough leveling
among social groups to assure the opportunity for some type and
degree of political participation by the people. If the newly formed
society consists of two groups, those completely disenfranchised and
those completely favored in the old society, then the new society
needs to take action to counter the adveise effects of the group differ-
ences. Otherwise, democracy will remain beyond reach.
With democracy supposedly blossoming throughout the world,
there is no better time than the present for "We the people" in the
United States to critically examine our democracy. We need to evalu-
ate our own social stratification and its effect on democratic govern-
ance. The critique becomes all the more valuable if conducted within
the context of our traditions because we can too easily dismiss exter-
nal analyses as foreign or alien. The analysis offered in this Article
draws upon past and present political theories, theoretical commen-
tary, and the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court-all
part of our tradition.
This Article attempts to construct an adequate theory of social
grouping to buttress democratic theory through a reconstruction of
Supreme Court opinions that examine suspect classifications for viola-
tions of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2
The judiciary often uses the term "suspect classes" generically to refer
2. "[N]or shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
[Vol. 45:107
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to the disadvantaged groups in our society.' Criticism of the Court's
suspect class analysis comes fairly easily because it fails to create a
unified scheme. The challenge, however, lies in constructing a more
justifiable and more unified method for categorizing social groups and
for determining which groups qualify for suspect (in the sense of mak-
ing the judiciary suspicious enough of the legislation to warrant judi-
cial protection of the referenced group) class4 status. This ambitious
undertaking results in suggestions,' which I believe fare better than
the Court's justifications, for judicial review of legislation regarding
suspect classes.
This Article sits somewhat precariously between Supreme Court
jurisprudence and democratic theory. My analysis may not satisfy
experts in legal or political theory because the proposals I make do
not provide a complete prescription for how courts should undertake
suspect class analysis,6 nor do they furnish the necessary components
for a democratic theory. Situating the analysis at the interface of legal
and political theory, however, has distinct advantages. The analysis
offered should enrich both legal and political theory, in spite of any
perceived deficiencies from either perspective.
Legal and democratic theorists tend to ignore the broad implica-
tions of the role of suspect classes, i.e., disadvantaged groups, in a
democratic system. My task is to make a persuasive case for the sig-
nificance of suspect class analysis for democracy and for the impor-
tance of democratic theory to suspect class analysis. Democratic
theory requires a normative theory of suspect classes. Suspect class
analysis by the Supreme Court, in turn, needs a more viable social
theory of democracy.7 Democratic theory should precede the Court's
suspect class analysis.
Section I of this Article offers a brief survey of the history of
democratic theory to illustrate that democratic theorists, sometimes
unwittingly, have either disfavored disadvantaged groups, or have
favored certain other groups, or both. Their references to "the peo-
ple" have proven to be underinclusive. The illustrations provided in
3. See infra notes 136-74 and accompanying text.
4. "Class" and "group" are used interchangeably throughout this Article.
"Disadvantaged groups" would be a better label than "suspect classes," but I shall continue to
use the latter term since that is the term the courts use.
5. Time, space, and modesty preclude me from labeling the suggestions as a fully
developed theory, although I shall freely employ the term "theory" (at times, interchangeably
with "model" and "analysis") throughout this Article for lack of a better term.
6. For example, I do not discuss the level of scrutiny needed for each suspect
classification.
7. A "social theory" consists of normative claims about the disparate status of groups
within a society with respect to their social, economic, political, and cultural power.
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this Article will demonstrate that democratic theorists made, and still
make, explicit or implicit claims about social groups. The democratic
theorists included in anthologies of political theory make objectiona-
ble, and mostly implicit, value judgments about certain social
groups 8-be they slaves, women, or the poor. Social groupings have
apparently become more complex in this century, but the problem of
the devaluation of those less powerful in the political/social arena has
not dissipated.
The historical survey of democratic theory should highlight,
without any pretentions to completeness, the fact that democratic the-
orists seldom addressed directly the problem of social hierarachy,
even though they made telling assumptions about social stratification.
For example, the seventeenth century philosopher, John Locke,
devised a democratic system that favored the then-rising middle class
and disfavored the poor, even though Locke and most of his subse-
quent commentators did not and do not explicitly acknowledge this.9
Locke, and the other theorists considered in Section I, have seriously
compromised their democratic theory by allowing for wide gaps
between social groups.
The existence of a social hierarchy, depending upon its severity,
violates a certain degree of leveling between social groups presup-
posed by any democratic theory. If reference to "the people" has any
meaning within the definition of "democracy," it cannot imply that
certain social groups are so disadvantaged that they become effec-
tively excluded from, or ignored by, the democratic system-in other
words, are not "people." Democratic theory, then, regardless of its
particular formulation, needs a social theory-a theory about how
social groups can be brought to a relatively even level. A social the-
ory must include an analysis that prescribes conditions assuring that
the disparity between social groups does not seriously undermine the
workings of the democracy.
While Section I spells out the problem, namely, the detrimental
effect of social hierarchy on democracy, Section II searches for a solu-
tion to the problem of social hierarchy. The search for a solution
begins in a rather odd place-in the literature surrounding the
Supreme Court's use of suspect classes in its interpretation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 0 The Court, at
8. I use "social" as a shorthand for "social, political, economic, and cultural." Social
groups include classifications along a number of different dimensions. Republicans fall under a
political grouping; the poor, under an economic grouping; and so forth. Suspect classes make
up a subclass of social groups.
9. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see supra note 2.
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least in its majority opinions, has not devised an adequate social the-
ory."' This failure is due, in part, to its reliance on a problematic
version of pluralism. 12 The version of pluralism adopted by the Court
relies on a political process justification for judicial review, whereby
the judiciary fixes malfunctions in the legislative process. This
method of analysis is known as the process model.'a According to the
process model, the legislative process fails adequately to consider the
interests of certain social groups, namely, the ones qualifying as sus-
pect classes, so the courts must assure that these groups get some
representation. '
4
Section III illustrates that despite its noble democratic inten-
tions, the Court does not set forth any defensible standards to deter-
mine which social groups qualify as suspect classes, thereby triggering
judicial intervention in the legislative process, and which do not.' 5
However, from the majority and dissenting opinions, and the litera-
ture surrounding candidates for suspect class status, a theoretically
sound proposal emerges.' 6 Group identity, group harm, and polit-
ical/social powerlessness provide the elements needed to construct a
successful case for suspect class status. Further, a social theory, glued
together by an anti-subjugation principle, also provides a stronger jus-
tification for judicial review than the one given by the process
model. 17
Of the many candidates for suspect class status, only four have
qualified: race,"8 gender, 19 alienage, 20 and illegitimacy, 2' This Article
11. See infra notes 136-81 and accompanying text. See generally Note, Suspect
Classification: A Suspect Analysis, 87 DICK. L. REV. 407, 427-34 (1982) (discussing the
inconsistencies of the Supreme Court's rulings on suspect classes).
12. See, e.g., Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
223 (1981) (criticizing the unduly constrained democratic theories found in J. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); and J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)). Both works attempt to present a scheme for unifying
many disparate Supreme Court decisions). For a criticism of Parker's views, see Bork, Styles
in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383 (1986).
13. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980); infra notes 79-92 and
accompanying text.
14. See J. ELY, supra note 13, at 73-104.
15. See infra notes 93-122 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 123-68 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 123-68 and accompanying text.
18. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 885
(1945).
19. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977). Gender
is a quasi-suspect classification, which calls for a lesser, intermediate level of scrutiny.
20. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 480-81 (1954) (national origin).
21. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968). Illegitimacy
is also a quasi-suspect classification.
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will espouse an expansive interpretation, far beyond the Court's
acceptance of these four candidates, of what constitutes a suspect
class. It shall propose that suspect classes should include the physi-
cally handicapped, the mentally retarded and mentally ill, homosexu-
als,22 the aged, and the poor.23
The process model promotes judicial activism only when dis-
crimination keeps a group out of the legislative process. In contrast, a
social theory encourages judicial involvement whenever a group suf-
fers from oppression or subjugation. A justification for judicial review
does not, however, imply a complete theory of judicial review. For
example, the justification says little about what level of analysis or
scrutiny courts should employ in evaluating legislation.2 4 It does not
offer ready solutions to problems such as benign racial classifica-
tions.2" In fact, some may see only a faint resemblance between the
end product of my proposal and the Court's suspect class analysis.
The difference may appear more pronounced, however, in light
of the Court's recent move closer to a suspect classification analysis in
contrast to a suspect class analysis.26 It will prove helpful to draw out
the distinction between suspect classifications and suspect classes,
even though these terms are used loosely, and sometimes interchange-
22. I use the term "homosexual" and not the term "gay" throughout the Article only to
conform to the Court's usage.
23. See infra notes 232-39 and accompanying text.
24. Under a rational basis test, a classification is valid if it is rationally related to any
legitimate governmental interest. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). At the opposite end
of the spectrum, under the strict or heightened scrutiny test, a suspect classification violates
equal protection unless the classification is necessary to further a compelling state interest.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). In between these two lies an intermediate level
whereby a classification must serve an important governmental objective and must be
substantially related to the achievement of that objective. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981).
25. See, e.g., Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context:
Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89, 115 (1984).
It is important to differentiate between negative stereotypes based on inherent
characteristics of the class and negative stereotypes based on the relative position
of the class in society. A stereotype based on an inherent characteristic-
"women are passive"-suggests the sort of prejudice that heightened scrutiny is
designed to identify and forbid. A stereotype based on societal status "Blacks are
socially disadvantaged" does not stigmatize the object of the generalization as
inherently inferior and thus is not evidence of prejudice.
Id.
26. See id. at 105-25 (providing an excellent discussion of the difference between
classification-based and class-based judicial review). I do not mean to imply that the Court
never employs a class-based analysis. As Sherry points out, the Court has used classification-
and class-based interpretations in a confused way. Id. at 109. Recently, however, the Court
has clearly swung over to the classification-based side of the spectrum. See City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating a local minority set-aside program). This
is the leading case that signals this shift.
SUSPECT CLASS DEMOCRACY
ably. A classification analysis focuses on whether the legislation in
question makes explicit classifications along group lines.27 A class
analysis, by contrast, focuses on whether the legislation has a negative
or impermissible, versus a benign, effect on the group itself.28 The
Court, at least in its recent theoretical formulations, seems more con-
cerned with "smoking out," in an apparently neutral fashion, the leg-
islature's prejudice by examining the classifications employed in
legislation.29 The Court has become highly suspicious, as evidenced
by City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. ,30 of any legislative classifica-
tion along racial lines, even if that classification benefits racial
minorities.
In contrast, I propose a categorization process of those suspect
classes that warrant heightened judicial (and democratic) concern,
which is much broader than the Court's. 31 The social theory provides
a standard by which to begin to evaluate the Court's analysis. The
Court's promotion of neutrality leads it in the direction of judicial
restraint, whereas the model I propose implies far greater judicial
activism and more normative decisionmaking on the part of the
Court.32 Under my proposal, the judiciary would become an impor-
tant guardian of disadvantaged groups, fulfilling a democratic role.
Although, I must again emphasize that the Court has not completely
abandoned suspect class analysis, the Court has recently retreated
from it to more of a classification analysis.
Section IV attempts to construct a social theory which is
stronger than that found in the Court's analysis; one that draws, in a
more defensible way, the boundaries around what social groups qual-
ify as suspect classes. The Justices of the Supreme Court have
referred to a wide array of factors to evaluate in these cases. These
factors constitute a hodge podge, with little or none of the unifying
27. See Sherry, supra note 25, at 105-06.
28. Id.
29. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
30. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
31. In other words, I am not so much interested in classifications along racial lines as I am
in the impact of legislation on disadvantaged groups, even in the absence of an explicit
classification.
32. The problem of judicial activism has spawned a plethora of commentary. Originalists,
for example, argue that confining judicial interpretation to the framers' intent helps to prevent
judicial tyranny. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). Non-
interpretativists, on the other hand, fear legislative, more than judicial, tyranny. See, e.g., M.
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE (1988).
While my proposals have some implications for the debate over judicial activism, I am not
committed to the claim that the judiciary is the only, or even the best, guardian of the interests
of disadvantaged groups. These broader topics relate to problems of separation of powers,
which I do not address in this Article.
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framework needed for a suspect classification.33 Under the principle
of anti-subjugation, I group these factors together into the following:
group identity, group harm, and social/political powerlessness.34
These factors do not yield a simple step-by-step algorithm for unam-
biguously determining whether a social group equals a suspect class.
Nor does each factor stand alone as an isolated unit. Rather, the fac-
tors depend upon one another, forming heuristics for deciphering sus-
pect classes. The resulting organic constellation of factors draws
fairly sweeping, but nonarbitrary, lines around suspect classes, thus
encompassing more social groups than the Court currently recog-
nizes. In Section V, I conclude that the grounds for adopting a social
model of suspect classes are set forth within democratic theory, and
that the Court should adopt a methodology such as the one I pro-
posed in Section IV in order to realize fully the promise of democracy
contained in the Constitution.
II. UNSOCIAL DEMOCRATIC THEORIES
A typical survey of democratic theory, old and new, begins with
Ancient Athens where democracy first flourished, leaps across history
landing in the seventeenth century England of John Locke, takes a
side-trip to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Europe and James Madison's
America, and makes a brief stop at the writings of John Stuart Mill,
before finally settling in on two prominent twentieth century theories,
namely, the competitive elitism of Joseph Schumpeter and the plural-
33. The following examples illustrate the Court's wide array of factors contributing to a
classification's suspectness. A class cannot be suspect if it possesses "none of the traditional
indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, reh'g denied, 411 U.S.
959 (1973). Regarding gender as a suspect classification, the Court noted that the "high
visibility of sex characteristic," its immutability, and the fact "that the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society," justified its status as
quasi-suspect. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). In rejecting age as a suspect
classification, the Court emphasized the stereotypic nature of suspect characteristics.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam).
Furthermore, the Court noted that age did not define a discrete and insular group. Id. (citing
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). Yet, the Court has, on
occasion, rejected discreteness and insularity as prerequisites to suspect status. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978). In considering illegitimacy, the Court spoke
of the "obvious badge" of identity worn by a suspect class. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
506 (1976).
So, some of the factors the Court includes are: a history of unequal treatment, political
powerlessness, immutable and stereotypic traits, discrete and insular characteristics (both
rejected and accepted by the Court), and badges of inferiority. See generally Note, supra note
11, at 413 n.45.
34. See infra notes 195-239 and accompanying text.
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ism of Robert Dahl." Problems proliferate in such a survey.3 6 This
Article focuses on just one set of difficulties within a sample of this
survey: the issue of which social theory the various democratic theo-
rists adopt, either explicitly or implicitly. Democratic theorists have
rather consistently promoted the interest of those higher in the social
hierarchy at the expense of those at the lowest levels without advanc-
ing any justification for the disparity. This is in part because of the
tendency to ignore existing hierarchies, or to acknowledge only some
aspects of them and not others.
Ignoring certain aspects of social hierarchy which work to
exclude certain groups and invoking others violates basic presupposi-
tions of democratic theory. For example, a political theory that limits
democratic participation to only rich White heterosexual males who
graduated from Yale University would hardly qualify as democratic
since it unjustifiably excludes other members of the demos or "the
people." Therefore, to qualify as a democratic theory, a theory needs
to make allowances for some effective action on the part of all of the
people.3 If the terms of the theory exclude, either explicitly or effec-
tively, certain social groups from that action, then it has failed as a
democratic theory. A brief analysis of some members of the survey
will illustrate the need for democratic theorists to include a social
theory.
Four approaches to democracy will be discussed: 1) Athenian
democracy; 2) the philosophy of Locke; 3) Schumpeter's competitive
elitism; and 4) Dahl's pluralism. Each one illustrates a point. The
first two explicitly exclude specific social groups. Athenian demo-
cratic practice, so often eulogized in discussions of democracy,
excluded specific social groups-slaves, women, and foreigners such
as the resident aliens (metics).38 Lockean political theory, seen by
many as the precursor of the philosophy underlying the founding doc-
35. See, e.g., D. HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987). While highly critical of various
democratic theories, Held adopts the canon, beginning with ancient Athens and ending at
Dahl. Among the most influential surveys along these lines are C.B. MACPHERSON, THE
REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY (1966); and C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1977).
36. Political scientists have begun to raise serious questions about how a theorist qualifies
for the list of worthy political philosophers. Why, for example, do few lists include Gerrard
Winstanley, a seventeenth century radical thinker and activist? See, e.g., C. CONDREN, THE
STATUS AND APPRAISAL OF CLASSIC TEXTS (1985); J. GUNNELL, BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY
AND POLITICS (1986).
37. Sartori, an influential contemporary democratic theorist, rejects five senses of "the
people"-"everybody," "a great many," "the lower class," "an organic whole," and "an
absolute majority"-in favor of a "limited majority principle." See G. SARTORI, THE THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 22-25 (1987).
38. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
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uments of the United States,39 omitted another social group, the
poor.4o
In contrast, the last two democratic approaches from the twenti-
eth century list illustrate formulations that exclude groups by implica-
tion. Exclusion by implication is effective exclusion. Schumpeter's
competitive elitism (democracy for politicians) illustrates that even
the most restrictive democratic theory needs a certain degree of level-
ing between social groups because a person's group status affects not
only the probability of that person becoming a democratic leader in
Schumpeter's system, but also whether the person will have any say
over the choice of those leaders.4' Dahl's pluralism (democracy by
minorities, i.e., interest groups), the final approach surveyed,42 sets
the broad outlines of the democratic theory relied upon by the
Supreme Court in the commonly accepted version of its analysis of
suspect classes. However, within even a pluralistic system, a person's
group status can affect the ability to form the interest groups so essen-
tial to Dahl's theory. A person's group identity can raise barriers to
her or his entrance into interest group politics. Each of these
problems will now be examined.
A. Athenian Democracy: The Social Costs of Participation
The average citizens of ancient Athens participated directly in
legislative and judicial functions on an immense scale. The Assembly,
with a quorum of 6,000, met over forty times per year in order to
decide all major issues.43 The president of the Assembly and most
major office holders were chosen by lot." The Athenian system is
often portrayed as a truly participatory democracy.45 Yet, Athenian
democracy had a dark side. Not everyone could qualify for
citizenship.
No scholar disputes that there were a number of oppressed, or at
least less well-off, groups in ancient Athens. These groups are gener-
ally acknowledged to be women, slaves, and foreigners-none of
whom qualified for citizenship.4 6 The problem is what to do with this
39. See, e.g., C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, A STUDY IN THE
HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 24-79 (1942). But cf G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1978)
(arguing that Thomas Reid left more of a legacy on American views of democracy, by virtue of
his influence on Thomas Jefferson's thought, than did John Locke).
40. See infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
43. See D. HELD, supra note 35, at 20-22.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 13-14 (1983).
46. See, e.g., J. DAVIES, DEMOCRACY AND CLASSICAL GREECE (1978); M. FINLEY,
[Vol. 45:107
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knowledge. How critical to the vitality of Athenian democracy was
the relegation to noncitizenship of these various groups?47 The Athe-
nian Assembly had no special mandate to look out for the welfare of
women or slaves. Does their oppression mean that the Athenian dem-
ocratic system must be rejected, despite its highly participatory quali-
ties? Rather than trying to answer those questions it is more
important here to note that this exclusivity of democratic rule existed
in ancient Athens. As a result of their explicit exclusion from the
Athenian democratic process, women and slaves had statuses lower
than that of a suspect class today. Minimally, exclusivity creates a
problem for Athenian democracy. On what grounds can a proponent
of democracy exclude certain social classes? I will assume that no one
in today's world would try to defend the exclusion of women, nor to
defend slavery, in a democracy. From our vantage point, the totally
excluded groups-slaves and women-should have qualified as mem-
bers of the Athenian polis. Our democracy, unlike that of Athens,
does not officially exclude any social group. 8 The question is: Do we
effectively exclude certain social groups?
Condemnation of a society that explicitly excludes social groups
and still proclaims itself a democracy comes easily. However, effec-
tive exclusion is equally unjustified and presents a more difficult and
pertinent concern for the modern era. For example, a group that
often suffers effective exclusion is the poor.49 Citizens, by the very
fact of their citizenship, would seem eligible for participation in the
democratic process and the poor are citizens.5" Nevertheless, they
often suffer from effective exclusion.51 For an example of a theory
ANCIENT SLAVERY AND MODERN IDEOLOGY (1980); A. JONES, ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY
(1977).
47. This question is extensively treated in J. OBER, supra note 1, at 27 ("In sum, while the
importance of slavery to Athenian society and economy should not be underestimated, no
direct, causal relationship between chattel slavery and social stability or democratic decision
making is demonstrable at Athens.").
48. Our view of democracy does explicitly exclude aliens, children, and persons convicted
of certain crimes, by denying them the right to vote. The theories which underlie these explicit
exclusions will not, for the most part, be challenged or examined in this Article.
49. The Athenians did make some effort to include a segment of the poor by compensating
citizens for participating in the Assembly. See A. JONES, supra note 46, at 4-5. It was not
necessary to have an independent income to participate in the democratic process; therefore,
the poor of Athens were not barred from democratic participation merely because of their
poverty. Id. But see generally J. OBER, supra note 1 (revealing the complexity of trying to
assess the role of wealth in Athenian democracy).
50. Actually, many of the poor may not be citizens but rather illegal aliens, a status which
may help to contribute to their poverty. However, for purposes of clarity in this discussion, I
shall use the term "the poor" to refer only to those who are economically, and not dually,
disadvantaged.
51. For an excellent description of how poor Appalachians were effectively excluded from
1990]
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which allows for their explicit exclusion, we turn to Locke.
B. Lockean Democracy: Representation for the Middle Class
According to the conventional surveys of democratic theory,
democracy "slept" for many years after the demise of Athenian
democracy until it slowly awakened to the light of John Locke in the
seventeenth century.52 For Locke, government served a protective
function by safeguarding the "natural right" of individuals to their
property.53 According to Locke, sovereign power ultimately resided
in the people, who had the power to withdraw their consent from the
government and to dissolve it.54 Locke's faith in "the people" seems
to place him firmly within the democratic tradition. Yet, who actu-
ally were "the people" for Locke? His vision of democracy does not
seem very democratic to modern eyes. For example, in promoting the
Convention Parliament (1688-1689) when James II withdrew from
the throne, Locke had no difficulty in supporting a "representative"
legislative body that had not actually been elected.
5
Locke saw the political world as classified along social lines.56
Property ownership placed a person within the realm of political legit-
imacy, and thus allowed males, but not females, to vote because
women could not own property.57 Yet, while property ownership
constituted a sufficient condition for political involvement under
Locke's scheme, it was not a necessary condition. Locke wanted also
to make room for the nonproperty-owning merchants, tradesmen, and
artisans.5" Nevertheless, despite Locke's inclusion of the above social
groups beyond property owners, he still cut out the "idle poor"
because in his view they violated his injunction to labor and to pursue
the electoral process, see J. GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND
REBELLION IN AN* APPALACHIAN VALLEY 141-64 (1980).
52. See supra note 35; cf. C. CONDREN, supra note 36; J. GUNNELL, supra note 36.
53. J. LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 9,
at 184 (T. Cook ed. 1947). To Locke, "property" included "li[fe], liberties, and estates." Id.
54. Id. ch. XIX.
55. R. ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS & LOCKE'S Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 568-69 (1986). Ashcraft tries to interpret Locke as a radical by revealing
Locke's involvement with the radical Whigs. Ashcraft presents evidence designed to show that
Locke's political writings, far from being abstract philosophical treatises, were, in fact, political
manifestoes. Id.
56. See, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDU-
ALISM 222-38 (1962).
57. J. LOCKE, supra note 53, § 140, at 193. Representation was proportional to taxes paid
by those with property.
58. See, e.g., R. ASHCRAFr, supra note 55, at 263-74.
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the common good. 59 Viewed through the lens of a social theory,
Locke's democracy looks like a democracy largely for the then-rising
middle class,6° rather than a democracy for all.61
Sensitivity to which social groups a model or theory excludes
should induce skepticism whenever someone, even obliquely, refers to
ancient Athens as an exemplar of a participatory democracy, or to
Locke as the theoretical founder of representative democracy. The
exclusions in Athenian practice were explicit and glaring, whereas
those in Locke's writings need some explication to be exposed. It is
even more difficult to uncover implicit exclusionary claims among
twentieth century democratic theorists. Two of these theories-com-
petitive elitism and classical pluralism-do not explicitly exclude dis-
advantaged social groups, but their structures can be read as
excluding certain social groups by implication. If this is so, then the
proponents of these theories need to make positive proposals to assure
the inclusion of these excluded groups.
C. Competitive Elitism: Constricted Democracy
Schumpeter, the leading proponent of competitive elitism,
62
restricts the governing structure as far as is possible while still calling
his theory democratic. However, as I shall show, even Schumpeter's
highly restrictive version of democracy requires some degree of level-
ing between social groups in order for it to work as envisioned.
Schumpeter defines democracy as "that institutional arrange-
ment for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the peo-
59. Id. In all fairness, as Ashcraft emphasizes, Locke also had harsh words for the "idle
gentry," whom Locke thought contributed little to the wealth of society. Id. at 269-70.
60. However, Locke's exclusion of the poor may have been more a product of the
prevailing socio/economic bias than a conscious decision. Locke wrote during the 1660-1690
period, just after the 1640-1660 period when the lower strata of English society had
vehemently asserted itself. See generally C. HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN
(1975) (Hill argues that the 1640-1660 period saw all the major institutions of British society
attacked from below by the lower classes.). From 1640-1660, almost every institutional
structure in England, including churches and scientific establishments, felt challenges
emanating from the lower classes. Id. Various forces combined to stamp out the voices of
protest that proliferated throughout English society during this period. Locke's exclusion of
the poor, or at least his relegation of them to secondary status, may well reflect the dominant
attitude towards the voices of the dissenting poor, whose sounds had been stifled, but had not
been forgotten by the time Locke wrote.
61. The poor, however, pose a particularly difficult challenge, not only for Locke, but for
any democratic theorist. The theorist faces the quandary that while nothing seems to justify
excluding the poor from democratic activities, their poverty acts as an effective bar to a great
deal of their participation in the governance of society, whether they are included in the theory
or not. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
62. See D. HELD, supra note 35, at 164-85.
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pie's vote."6 3 Schumpeter unabashedly advocates a democracy for the
politicians.64 He begins with the premise that we live in a bureau-
cratic state,65 where talk of participation by the people is at best
unrealistic.66 Only a well-trained elite, he claims, qualifies to rule over
the large, complex modem state.67 Schumpeter divides the political
world between an elite cadre of technocrats and everyone else.68
While Schumpeter's theory may appear non-democratic, he proposes
that through elections "the people" have the opportunity to accept or
to reject the ruling elite, and thus have a sort of ultimate control over
the democratic process.69
However, this theory presupposes a minimal ability among the
electorate to make informed decisions about the politicians/rulers.
Schumpeter must therefore acknowledge that a leveling, in terms of
levels of information, is necessary with respect to the social groups
involved in the democratic process of electing rulers out of office, if
the process is not to be effectively controlled by an informed elite,
rather than by "the people" as a whole. If certain social groups are
either completely misinformed, or uninformed, about the policies and
qualifications of the ruling elite who compete for their vote, then the
elite are not really "chosen" by "the people" in any meaningful sense
of the word.
Schumpeter assumes that citizens exhibit at least a modicum of
intelligence in choosing their political leaders. He takes it for granted
that the electorate actually responds to factors such as the training,
qualifications, and policies of the political candidates rather than, for
example, their good looks.7" This may not be a valid assumption.
Social stratification, particularly along economic lines, can seriously
undermine the goal of an informed citizenry. Where it exists, it can
make a mockery of the idea of "choice." For example, the homeless
and the hungry encounter difficulties in becoming fully informed
about the drawbacks of particular politicians, thereby placing them at
considerable disadvantage relative to other voters (assuming that they
even vote). So, while Schumpeter does not explicitly exclude social
groups from participation, his system is distorted if he implicitly
63. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1976).
64. Id. at 285. Schumpeter's democracy for the politicians stands at the opposite end of
the spectrum from the ancient Athenian sense of democracy as a way of life.
65. Id. at 206.
66. Id. at 256.
67. Id. at 282.
68. Id. at 295.
69. Id. at 282.
70. For a similar criticism, see D. HELD, supra note 35, at 180.
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allows for the exclusion of some social groups, or if he proposes no
mechanism by which to assure the full participation of the eligible
electorate.
D. Pluralism: Rule by Non-Disadvantaged Minorities
Consideration of classical pluralism, the second twentieth cen-
tury theory, highlights the inadequacies of the democratic theory
adopted by the courts in equal protection analysis. Robert Dahl, the
most notable champion of pluralism,71 characterizes democracy as the
rule of minorities.72 Dahl divides the political world into many inter-
est groups which he claims compete with one another. 7' Rule, or
even tyranny, by the majority is therefore less of a threat in Dahl's
system because of this competition. Furthermore, under his theory,
competition among interest groups creates fluidity as interest groups
form alliances. These shifting alliances mean that any one group is
sometimes with the majority and sometimes with the minority.74 Dis-
advantaged groups only become a concern for Dahl to the extent that
their status impedes the political process.75 Accordingly, to Dahl, the
political process is a dynamic which is basically sound, but occasion-
ally in the need of adjustment. In this version of classical pluralism,
disadvantaged groups are not explicitly excluded from the political
process; they, like any others, can form interest group organizations
and enter into alliances.
The pluralist's analysis seriously underestimates the capabilities
of disadvantaged social groups. Some groups have little access to
resources that would enable them to form an interest group. Further-
more, far less fluidity seems to exist between social groups than the
pluralists assume, especially when we start thinking of groups in
terms of racial and ethnic minorities. Dahl, however, continues to
view minorities as a quantitative minority without fully acknowledg-
71. Id. at 192.
72. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE FOR DEMOCRATIC THEORY 133 (1956).
73. R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 5, 28 (1982) (defining pluralisms in
terms of relatively autonomous organizations).
74. R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 59 (1976).
75. Dahl's writings actually exhibit a broader concern. Dahl noted the distorting effects of
extreme inequalities and subculture pluralism (social groups, in terms of this Article). R.
DAHL, POLYARCHY 81-104 (1971). His most recent writings indicate a considered sensitivity
to the problems of inequality, especially economic inequality, and disadvantaged groups. See
R. DAHL, supra note 72; R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989). "[T]he existence of
sizable inequalities in political resources among the citizens should be disturbing to anyone
who places a high value on political equality." R. DAHL, supra note 72, at 53. However, it is
the classical formulation of pluralism that the Court seems to adopt and that therefore
concerns us here.
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ing varying capabilities within these distinct groups to form interest
groups. So, "rule by minorities" could mean rule by certain, more
socially advantaged interest groups, to the exclusion of disadvantaged
social groups, unless Dahl provides assurances to the contrary.
Although there is much more to classical pluralism, such as its refor-
mulations in neo-pluralism, 76 the above description should suffice for
understanding the judiciary's reliance on it. The Court's development
of a suspect classification analysis takes place against the background
of this theory of democracy.
As I have demonstrated in this Section, democratic theories
come in many varieties. All democratic theories, however, make, or
should make, some claim about social groups and how they ought to
be situated relative to one another. In the next Section, I will show
how the Court and some legal theorists have worked within the con-
fines of a particular version of democratic theory, namely, classical
pluralism. As we have seen, classical pluralism recognizes a .narrow
set of inequalities, i.e., those that directly infect the political process.
Before demonstrating the need to broaden the list of disadvantaged
groups so as to expand the types of inequalities considered, and
describing the Court's current treatment of suspect classes, I want to
describe the history of the Court's development of suspect class analy-
sis. First, I explore the Court's early formulations. Then I turn to
attempts by commentators to find a unified treatment, before I go on
to describe the Court's current treatment.
III. SUSPECT CLASS JURISPRUDENCE
Three domains of suspect class analysis are investigated in this
Section: (1) whether any social group should get judicial protection;
(2) how the Court justifies its protection of certain groups; and (3)
which specific groups qualify as suspect classes. The discussion below
roughly follows a historical development beginning with the Court's
first formulation in 1938 and ending with the Court's current con-
struction of suspect classes.
In 1938, the Court began to lay the groundwork for suspect class
analysis through the Carolene Products77 doctrine. Ely proposed the
process model as a bold attempt to unify Supreme Court opinions and
to prescribe future directions for the Court on suspect classes and
76. See, e.g., R. DAHL, supra note 72. Dahl argues that the economic inequalities of
corporate capitalism undermine the democratic process. Dahl proposes worker control,
through participation, as one way of leveling the playing field. Id. at 52-110.
77. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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other matters. 78 As we shall see below, neither the Carolene Products
approach, nor Ely's process model, proved a completely accurate
depiction of how the Court rules or of how the Court should rule on
suspect classes. They do, however, provide steps toward a unified the-
ory, as well as invaluable insights.
A. The Carolene Products79 Doctrine
During the Lochner8° era, an activist judiciary invalidated
numerous pieces of social legislation in order to protect freedom of
contract."1 That era came to an abrupt end in 1937.82 On the tail of
the winds of change came a seemingly unremarkable decision, United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 8 3 which dealt with a rather mundane
subject, a Congressional ban on the interstate shipment of skimmed
milk mixed with nonmilk fats.14 The decision itself hardly qualifies as
historical, to say nothing of noteworthy,85 but Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone's Footnote 486 has taken on a notorious life of its own, becom-
78. See J. ELY, supra note 13.
79. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
80. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York statute setting
maximum hours for bakers on grounds that the statute violated the freedom of employers and
employees to contract with each other). For a period of time following the Lochner decision,
the Court invalidated many similar statutes. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262 (1932) (invalidating Oklahoma attempt to make ice manufacturing a public utility);
Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (invalidating state's attempt to
regulate commodity prices); Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, 261 U.S. 255 (1923) (invalidating
District of Columbia minimum wage); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating
state law prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)
(invalidating similar federal law). The Lochner era illustrated the Court's marked insensitivity
to the power relations between two social groups: employers and employees. "Freedom of
contract" becomes problematic in light of the differential bargaining power between employers
and employees.
81. See supra note 80.
82. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining state regulation
of women's wages).
83. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
84. Id. at 145-46.
85. However, in a day of anti-cholesterol sentiment, a decision invalidating a statute that
proclaimed milk without butterfat to be "an adulterated article of food, injurious to the public
health" might well qualify as noteworthy. See Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products
Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982).
86. Footnote 4 provides in full:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-370; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 452.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
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ing "the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law.""7 Although
commentators may exaggerate the impact of the Carolene Products
footnote, for no sound theoretical edifice is built upon commentaries
to a footnote, a great deal of contemporary constitutional jurispru-
dence stems from this seemingly innocuous footnote."8
Footnote 4 contains a very clear structure, with each of its three
paragraphs spelling out a distinct jurisprudential doctrine. Paragraph
1, as modified by Chief Justice Hughes,89 encapsulates the debate
between those who, like Hughes, advocated complete incorporation of
the Bill of Rights,9° thereby making it binding on the states as well as
the federal government, and those (the eventual winners in the
debate) who proposed selective incorporation. 9' Paragraph 2 pro-
poses a more exacting form of scrutiny when legislation directly
impedes the political process. The Court, acting within the tradition
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types
of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73; on restraints upon the dissemination of
information, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-714, 718-720,
722; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on
interferences with political organizations, see Stromberg v. California, supra, 369;
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-378;
Herndon v. Loury, 301 U.S. 242; and see Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 673; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 365.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404;
Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. [2]84, or racial minorities, Nixon v. Hendron,
supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra: whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 428; South Carolina v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184, n. 2, and cases cited.
304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
87. Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982). Justice Powell
"counted at least 28 cases in which Footnote 4 has been cited in either a majority, concurring,
or dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court." Id. at 1087 n.4; see also J. ELY, supra note 13, at
148 ("In fact Justice Blackmun was the first ever-apart, of course, from Justice Stone's
original Carolene Products footnote-to indicate in an Opinion of the Court that 'discrete and
insular' minorities are entitled to special constitutional protection from the political process.").
88.. Cf Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("A
footnote hardly seems to be an appropriate way of announcing a new constitutional
doctrine.").
89. Professor Louis Lusky, Justice Stone's law clerk at the time Carolene Products was
decided, describes how Justice Stone modified Paragraph 1 in response to a letter from Chief
Justice Hughes. See Lusky, supra note 85, at 1096-100.
90. Id. at 1100-02.
91. Id. at 1102-03.
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of classical pluralism, adopted the principle of Paragraph 2 almost
immediately.92 The underlying theory of Paragraph 3, strict scrutiny
of legislation affecting "discrete and insular minorites," took many
more years to settle in, with that process finally culminating in Brown
v. Board of Education.93 Although Paragraphs 2 and 3 relate to each
other,94 I will focus primarily on Paragraph 3, while alluding to Para-
graph 2 at various points.
What is the story behind the adoption of Footnote 4, and why
has it generated such an intense interest among jurists? Professor
Cover's analysis in tracing the history of Footnote 4 provides an apt
example of the use of a social theory to help answer these questions.95
Cover argues that the adoption of Footnote 4 brought the first full-
fledged judicial recognition of a social sense of "minorities." 96 Prior
to that time, he claims, the classical pluralist sense of quantitative
minorities predominated and minorities did not possess, at least in the
eyes of the judiciary, any qualities indicative of disadvantaged
groups.97 I disagree with Cover's overall assessment. There is ample
evidence to suggest that an implicit official use of a social sense of
minorities existed throughout the history of the United States. 98
However, his dating of the official recognition of socially construed
minorities dovetails nicely with a theme of this Article that the judici-
ary should continue to give more expansive treatment to a social
92. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); see also Lusky, supra note
85, at 1103-04 (showing how the then current members of the Court recognized that the Court
had been using the precepts of Paragraph 2 all along).
93. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a more detailed discussion along the lines set forth in this
paragraph, see Lusky, supra note 85, at 1104.
94. Brilmayer, Carotene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Insider-Outsider," 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 1291, 1296 (1986) (portraying Paragraph 3 as a collateral attack on what Paragraph 2
attacks directly, viz., legislative proceedings).
95. See Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1294-97 (1982).
96. Id. at 1294.
97. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (including
cases cited within Paragraph 2).
98. In THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 1 (J. Madison) (M. Beloff ed. 1987) Madison may
well have had in mind debtors such as those led by Daniel Shay, who led a rebellion in
Massachusetts, when he warned against the disruptive influence of minority factions. In other
words, Madison was not simply concerned with the power of any special interest group but
rather, he was particularly disturbed by the rebellious group of small farmers who were
demanding the abolition of their debt following the Revolution in return for their participation
in the Revolution. See Cover, supra note 95, at 1294 n.46; see also C. FROMAN, THE Two
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS 5-14 (1984); D. SZATMARY, SHAY'S REBELLION 121-34
(1980); H. ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 92-101 (1980). But cf
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 29-45 (1985).
Madison "saw the 'corruption' that created factions as a natural, though undesirable, product
of liberty and inequality in human faculties." Id. at 39.
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interpretation of minorities.99
In contrast to Cover's sympathetic reading of Footnote 4, Chief
Justice Rehnquist raised the specter of arbitrariness with respect to
"discrete and insular minorities."' ' °° According to Rehnquist, the
Court can freely create suspect classes under this standard, unfettered
by any standards. 101 Given the contorted way in which the Court has
drawn the boundaries around "discrete and insular" minorities,
Rehnquist's reservations seem well founded. What factors could pos-
sibly unite race, alienage, gender, and illegitimacy? 0 2 However, to
admit to the arbitrary nature of current boundaries does not imply
that defensible line-drawing shall forever remain beyond reach. Nev-
ertheless, before meeting that challenge, 10 3 we need to examine the
terrain as set out by the Court. Upon what theory does the Court rely
in differentiating "discrete and insular minorities" from other minori-
ties, and has that theory outlasted its usefulness?
In a recent article, Professor Ackerman"° applauds the past use
of Footnote 4 in dealing with racial problems but sees it of limited
value in dealing with the most critical social problems of the future. 105
I contend that even its former utility warrants reassessment. Acker-
man argues that the terms "discrete, .... insular," and "prejudice" do
not adequately protect those groups most in need of protection in
today's society.'" According to Ackerman, Blacks qualify as discrete
and insular; women only as discrete and diffuse, but not insular;
homosexuals as anonymous, and not discrete but insular; the poor as
neither discrete nor insular.'07 While conceding that Blacks still suf-
fer from discrimination, Ackerman distinguishes Blacks from these
other groups, which he says have not achieved the degree of represen-
99. For proponents of the argument for judicial restraint, see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (2d ed. 1978); Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). For classical defenses of judicial
activism, see C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); Wright, Professor Bickel, The
Scholarly Tradition and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
100. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It would
hardly take extraordinary ingenuity for lawyers to find 'insular and discrete' minorities at
every turn in the road.").
101. Id. at 651-57.
102. Race, alienage, gender, and illegitimacy are the four categories of disadvantaged social
groups given protection by the Court. See infra notes 136-74 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 182-239 and accompanying text.
104. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
105. Id. at 717-18.
106. Id. at 742.
107. See id. at 729. The courts have never defined "discrete" or "insular" in the narrow




tation which Blacks have at the pluralist bargaining table.° 8 Despite
my agreement with the groups Ackerman wants to include for protec-
tion, he appears too closely wedded to the pluralist underpinnings of
the Carolene Products analysis."°
Nonetheless, Ackerman finds two insights gleaned from a
Carolene Products approach. 110 The first is a procedural insight
which concerns the relatively weak bargaining power of certain social
groups."'I The second is a substantive insight which centers on a
moral judgment denouncing prejudice against disadvantaged
groups. 112 Ackerman applauds the first insight, protection of disad-
vantaged groups, at the pluralist. bargaining table." 3 However, Ack-
erman's sympathetic treatment of Footnote 4 cannot hide one of its
glaring defects: even on its own terms the Carolene Products analysis
fails. Black representation at the pluralist bargaining table does not
directly correlate with the improvement of Blacks as a social group.
Although Ackerman seems to recognize its difficulties, he refuses to
discard Carolene Products in its allegedly successful application to
racial minorities. This leads him to imply that "the anonymous and
diffuse victims of poverty and sexual discrimination," ' 4 and not
Blacks, have "the most serious complaints"' 15 today. Contrary to
Ackerman's claim, Blacks still have very serious complaints at the
pluralist bargaining table." 6 However, this does not imply a complete
rejection of the Carolene Products analysis because it has opened some
important seats to, and for, racial minorities at the pluralist bargain-
ing table. But, it does imply that the progressive scope of Carolene
Products is far more limited than Ackerman's interpretation permits.
Ackerman's ambivalence over Carolene Products also manifests a
deeper problem. While Justice Stone cast Footnote 4 in terms of
social groups (racial, religious, and national minorities),' 17 Carolene
Products only becomes fully operable when the concepts "social
108. According to Ackerman, the pluralist "bargaining model captures an important aspect
of American politics." Id. at 743. Blacks, having taken advantage of their position at the
pluralist bargaining table, "can deal with the problem [of prejudice] politically in ways that
other victims of prejudice may be powerless to match." Id. at 737.
109. Id. at 742.
110. Id. at 740-41.
111. Id. at 740.
112. Id. at 741.
113. Id. at 742.
114. Id. at 745.
115. Id.
116. For an excellent collection of studies describing the electoral problems confronting
Blacks, see JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES MINORITY VOTE DILUTION (C.
Davidson ed. 1984).
117. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (paragraph 3).
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group" and "interest group" completely mesh. Racial minorities also
deserve judicial protection when the legislative system precludes them
from becoming interest groups. It is only when a disadvantaged
group, such as a racial minority, solidifies into an interest group capa-
ble of political negotiation and bargaining, that it has a lesser claim on
protection under Carolene Products.
In order to revitalize Carolene Products, the doctrine cannot be
made to draw an inextricable connection between social groups and
interest groups. If the doctrine is to be reformulated so as to admit
past failures, even with respect to Blacks, it must be re-cast in terms of
social groups. Interest groups and social groups are not equivalent.
All interest groups are not social groups. All social groups are not
interest groups. However, even if a social group achieves representa-
tion in the political process through the formation of an interest
group, the social group may still need judicial protection.
John Hart Ely provides the most complete reformulation of
Carolene Products in his seminal work, Democracy and Distrust."8
He reforms it in terms of the process model but, as will become appar-
ent below, Ely's failure to construct his theory in terms of social
groups also makes it vulnerable to attack.
B. Ely and the Process Model
Judges and defenders of the judiciary worry about the
countermajoritarian argument. 119  According to this argument,
democracy goes hand-in-hand with majority rule. The judiciary can
only play a precarious role in majoritarian politics. Majoritarians
cannot countenance a judiciary of the few imposing its substantive
values on the majority. 12 0 Nevertheless, the process model finds a role
for the judiciary, a role not only compatible with majoritarian democ-
racy, but one that serves to protect that democracy.
According to the process model, the judiciary helps to assure the
smooth functioning of pluralist democracy. 2 ' Pluralists readily
admit to glitches in the democratic operations. On the pluralist
model, democracy involves the competition between various interest
groups. The interests of some individuals are not considered because
118. J. ELY, supra note 13.
119. See, e.g., id. at 4-5. The counter-majoritarian argument can be summed up as follows:
"[The concern is that a] body that is not elected, or otherwise politically responsible in any
significant way is telling the people's elected representatives that they cannot govern as they'd
like." Id.
120. See J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103-07 (1901) for a classical statement of the
counter-majoritarian concern.
121. See J. ELY, supra note 13, at 80.
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they belong to relatively powerless groups, which cannot or have not
formed coalitions with more powerful interest groups. The ordinary
political process cannot, therefore, be relied upon to protect their
interests. 122 Prejudice directed at these minorities diminishes their
ability to form coalitions.
Cracks in the political process, caused by prejudice, create open-
ings for the courts. When the political process malfunctions, by either
restricting the voice and vote of those not adequately represented, or
by prejudicially ignoring the interests of "discrete and insular minori-
ties," the judiciary can correct these malfunctions by invalidating the
legislation that was distorted by these improper processes. 23 Accord-
ing to Ely, judicial review is justified when it yields representation-
reinforcing action. 24 The Court thereby merely protects the political
process and the role of minorities within that process. Thus, a process




However, the troublesome nature of the counter-majoritarian
argument begins to deflate in light of other areas where it does not
operate with the same force. What justifies the process model from
getting off the ground in the first place? The process model answers
the counter-majoritarian difficulty, but where does the hypersensitiv-
ity to judicial assaults on majority rule come from? Although the
Court is severely criticized when it invalidates legislation, administra-
tive agencies, or seldom scrutinized organizations such as the Ameri-
can Law Institute, 126 are not subjected to the same counter-
majoritarian critique as that launched against the Court. 27 Bureau-
cratic complexity in the modem state makes all branches of govern-
ment vulnerable to counter-majoritarian concerns. Yet, not only do
the counter-majoritarians keep silent when a candidate wins an elec-
122. See id. at 135 ("In 1957 the Alabama Legislature redrew, by statute, the boundary
lines of the City of Tuskegee so as to change its shape from a square to an 'uncouth twenty-
eight-sided figure' and, in the process, to exclude all but a handful of the city's four hundred
previously resident black voters."). Id. at 139-40.
123. Id. Ely draws an analogy here between the judiciary and a referee, who intervenes,
"only when one team is gaining an unfair advantage, not because the 'wrong' team has
scored." Id.
124. See id. at 86.
125. However, the process model has given rise to a cottage industry of critiques. See, e.g.,
Ackerman, supra note 104; Brilmayer, supra note 94; Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness on the
Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J.
1037 (1980).
126. See. e.g., J. VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 139 (1986).
127. Cf M. PARENTI, DEMOCRACY FOR THE FEW 255-74 (1988) (criticizing the federal
bureaucracy as anti-democratic).
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tion with less than either a majority of the votes cast, or of the eligible
votes, but also, candidates often claim they have a "mandate" from
the voters, whether or not they command a majority of those vot-
ers. '28 All this casts some doubt on whether the counter-majoritarian
critique has any solid basis.
Nevertheless, a tu quoque ("you too") argument should not carry
the day. Like its Carolene Products counterpart, which analyzes legis-
lation in terms of its impact on discrete and insular minorities, the
process model has some valuable insights; it simply needs redirection.
The judiciary should exercise concern for the malfunctioning of the
political process, but the definition of the "political process" needs
expanding beyond the process model's narrow interpretation as
merely the legislative process. 29 Grave disparities between the power
of various social groups undermine the social process, which, in turn,
affects the overall political process. 30 The political process should
account for those social dynamics which eventually culminate in for-
mal electoral politics. If a social group is so powerless that it cannot
even get on the legislative agenda (if only to give the legislature a
chance to exercise prejudice against it), then democracy is enfeebled.
Ely's process model is simply not rich enough to incorporate the
social inequities underlying his narrow sense of the "political." For
example, according to Ely, suspect classifications are rooted in "we/
they" generalizations whereby the legislators perceive the subject
class of the legislation as the "they's" in contrast to the "we's" in the
legislature.' 3' A legislatively drawn classification between Blacks and
128. J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY 33 (1983) ("In winning the [1980] victory
that continues to be labeled a 'mandate' and a 'landslide' by the national press, Ronald Reagan
gained a smaller percentage of the eligible electorate than did Wendell Wilkie in his decisive
1940 loss to Roosevelt.").
129. See J. ELY, supra note 13. Throughout his book, Ely talks about legislative process.
130. At one point, Ely explicitly recognizes the distinction between the political and the
social. See J. ELY, supra note 13, at 161. However, the social becomes important for Ely only
insofar as it serves as a breeding ground for prejudice that blocks the roads to the political
process. Id. So, for Ely, the social plays a secondary role, one on which he does not place very
much emphasis.
131. See id. at 159-60 ("By seizing upon the positive myths about the groups to which they
belong and the negative myths about those to which they don't, or for that matter the realities
respecting some or most members of the two classes, legislators, like the rest of us, are likely to
assume too readily that not many of 'them' will be unfairly deprived, nor many of 'us' unfairly
benefited, by a classification of this type."). But cf Tushnet, supra note 125, at 1053. Tushnet
provides some trenchant criticisms of Ely's "we/they" analysis. Whether the situation falls
into the "we/they" or the "they/they" classification depends on the level of analysis. Almost
any situation can be defined as "they/they" and thus avoid strict scrutiny. For example, in
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 (1977), the Court held unconstitutional a statute that
discriminated against illegitimates by prohibiting inheritance through intestate succession in
situations where legitimate children could inherit. On one level, this situation reflects the "we/
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Whites, he claims, "has its root in a comparison between a 'we' stere-
otype and a 'they' stereotype."' 132 In contrast, a legislative classifica-
tion on the basis of gender, does not arise out of a "we/they"
generalization. 133 Ely limits his use of social theory largely to an anal-
ysis of the legislative process. He must assess whether the legislators
traditionally have been Black 134 or whether women have ready ways
to become legislators or to attain representation. 3  Although the
social matrix outside of the legislature plays a role in the process
model, it is only a derivative one because the process model is
designed to tease out only one kind of social disparity, that reflected
in legislative stereotypes.
Ely tries to level the playing field vis-a-vis prejudice against cer-
tain groups, but his process model nevertheless views that playing
field as a narrow one, leaving little room in which the judiciary can
referee. The process model merely tries to winnow out legislative prej-
udice, prejudice which constitutes only a small obstacle blocking the
development of certain social groups such as Blacks. Blacks face
many other kinds of prejudice and structural forms of discrimination
that stymie their role as citizens. Ely has identified a problem, but the
legislature's perception of itself as a unified "us" against a discrete
and insular "them" seems to play only a small role in the overall
scheme of political power.
If the process model tries to justify a form of judicial review
within democratic theory, it fails. Far worse threats than representa-
tional failure threaten democracy. Significant proportions of certain
social groups do not even have enough resources to suit up players for
the process model game, despite the fact that some of their "own
kind" may already be playing. Social hierarchy can garner enough
force to cause serious earth tremors underneath the playing field. For
this reason, perhaps the judiciary's role is more aptly compared to
that of a seismologist, rather than to that of a referee. Fairness on the
political field pales in comparison to the social ground crumbling
beneath our feet.
The basis for an expanded judicial role, though, lies directly
they" dichotomy since legislators will likely be legitimates. However, on another level, the
statute reflects the "they/they" dichotomy since legislators are likely to have written wills.
132. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723,
732 (1974).
133. See J. ELY, supra note 13, at 164. Why the impact of the vote should nullify the effect
of women's under-representation in the legislature for women, and Black emancipation should
not, is not clear.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 164-70.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:107
within the judiciary's own opinions to which I now turn. So far, I
have examined the underlying democratic theory put forth by the
Court following the Lochner era, as well as that by commentators
such as Ely, who have tried to improve upon the Court's own pro-
noucements. Now I look at the cases themselves.
C. Suspect Classes
The Court has considered a number of social groups as candi-
dates for suspect classes.'36 The list includes racial minorities, aliens,
women, illegitimates, the mentally retarded, the poor, homosexuals,
the aged, and the children of illegal aliens.'37 In the order used here,
the cut off line hovers around illegitimates.3M The groups above the
illegitimacy classification have attained suspect class status; those
below have failed to qualify.
Because of our long and sordid history of privately and publicly
sanctioned racism in the United States, racial minorities serve as the
paradigmatic suspect class, triggering strict scrutiny by the Court.
Strict scrutiny means that the Court will invalidate any piece of legis-
lation that involves a racial or otherwise suspect classification unless
the state can show that the classification is a necessary means to serve
a compelling interest. 139 In short, the state will almost always lose
when the Court finds a suspect classification worthy of strict
136. The Court first explicitly used suspect classification analysis in the now infamous
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding constitutional the relocation of
Japanese residents on the West Coast), reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945). Korematsu was the
first case to explicitly refer to race as a suspect classification, and it was the last case in which a
racial or ethnic classification survived strict scrutiny. The Court had previously referred to
suspect classes, though less explicitly, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(invalidating an ordinance that unduly burdened a racial minority in its application).
137. See supra notes 18-21.
138. In Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), the Court returned to an intermediate
level of scrutiny, thus retreating from the strict scrutiny for illegitimates established in Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968). Despite giving illegitimates a higher
level of scrutiny than the rational basis test given to other groups, such as the aged, the Court
has refused to treat illegitimacy as a suspect classification.
139. The Court, in Korematsu, held that racial classifications should be held to the "most
rigid scrutiny." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. It noted that although "[p]ressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of [legislative] restrictions; racial antagonism
never can." Id. Under strict scrutiny, the Court requires not only a "pressing public
necessity," but also a tight fit between the means and the ends. See, e.g., In Re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). The Court accepted the judgment
of military authorities that the incarceration and dispossession of Japanese living in the United
States was a military imperative. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-20. In McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964), the Court held that a racial classification must "bear[] a heavy
burden of justification.., and will be upheld only if it is necessary and not merely rationally
related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."
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scrutiny. 40
Race, alienage, ancestry, 4 1 and to a lesser extent, gender and ille-
gitimacy constitute the other accepted suspect classes. 42 Unfortu-
nately, the Court never clearly delineates the criteria for
differentiating these classes from other candidate classes. The most
complete set of standards the Court has ever offered was in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.143  There, in
rejecting poverty as a suspect classification, the Court stated that it
had "none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."'"
In the discussion below, I offer a brief analysis of four accepted
suspect classifications: race, alienage, gender, and illegitimacy. Here
I draw freely on material treated more fully in the next Section. The
discussion serves more as a bridge between the pitfalls of the process
model and the virtues of the social model, than as a complete survey
of the Court's treatment of suspect classes. The critique raises a
number of questions about the current status of suspect classification
analysis which the proposed social model should answer.
1. RACE
Race presents the least problematic suspect classification, and
rightfully so. Given the sordid history in this country of institutional-
ized racism and modern problems of de facto segregation, race serves
as the paradigm suspect class both under current jurisprudence and
140. Strict scrutiny has been for the most part aptly described as "strict in theory and fatal
in fact." Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). In contrast, the state will almost
always win if the Court employs a rational basis test, whereby a statute will be upheld so long
as the means used by the legislature is reasonably related to the legislature's purpose. Id.
While the Court has, at times, loosely construed the rational basis test as nonarbitrary, it has
also accepted a stricter formulation: "[t]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
141. I have not included a separate treatment of ancestry and national origin. For purposes
of this Article, they can be included under race.
142. See supra notes 18-21.
143. 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 459 (1973).
144. Id. at 28. Before turning to problems in applying these criteria, I would just like to
note that apparently the Court refuses, except in certain circumstances, to acknowledge that
the poor, in fact, do have these traditional indicia of suspectness. I find that refusal baffling.
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under the proposed social theory.'45 Even those wishing to see a col-
orblind Constitution, with no "special treatment" for any one group,
accept the importance of race. 146 Few would argue that Blacks place,
as a group, very high along the hierarchy of well-off social groups.
The electoral success of a few Blacks has not radically altered this
reality of social ranking for Blacks, even though it admittedly has had
some impact.147
Official subjugation of peoples into slavery, irrespective of their
racial characteristics, deserves condemnation. However, the effective
enslavement of a people, on the basis of their racial characteristics, is
even more abhorrent and creates a national wound from which this
nation may never recover. The horrors of that subjugation should
not, however, blind us to the drawbacks of treating race as the para-
digm suspect class. One of those drawbacks is that all other disadvan-
taged groups may not share the characteristics of race. Many
disadvantaged groups do not wear the badge of subjugation as promi-
nently as do racial minorities. Alienage illustrates this point.
2. ALIENAGE
The Court has regarded aliens as a discrete and insular minor-
145. While the Court and I accept race as a suspect classification, we differ on the next
phases of the analysis. The Court looks primarily at the suspect classification and downplays
or rejects any focus on the disparate impact of legislation on members of the race. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). But cf Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449, 464-65 (noting that "actions having forseeable and aniticipated disparate impact are
relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose"), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887
(1979). I, however, concentrate on the disparate impact on suspect classes.
146. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Justice O'Connor
concedes that a strong evidentiary showing of past private racial discrimination might be
sufficient to get a benign racial classification past the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 497-506. So
O'Connor, even though she advocates a colorblind Constitution, would allow for some benign
racial classifications.
147. Ackerman cites a number of statistics to illustrate the political success of Blacks. For
example, in the 1982 congressional elections, voting participation among Blacks was 43%;
among Whites, 50%. The number of Blacks elected to public office increased tenfold from
1965 to 1982. See Ackerman, supra note 104, at 744 n.56 & 745 n.57. However, Parenti
argues:
The infant mortality rate in the United States is worse than in twenty other
western nations, and twice as bad for Black infants as for White ones, because of
poverty and the relative inaccessibility of prenatal and postnatal care. In eleven
countries women have a better chance to live through childbirth than in the
United States. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the number of people
who live below the poverty level climbed from 24 million in 1977 to about 35
million in 1986, making the poor the fastest growing demographic group in the
United States ....
M. PARENTI, supra note 127, at 30. In 1987, 11% to 15% (depending on the measure used) of
all Whites fell below the poverty income line, whereas 33% to 40% of all Blacks fell below that
line. J. HENSLIN, SOCIAL PROBLEMS 256 (2d ed. 1990).
1990] SUSPECT CLASS DEMOCRACY
ity, 148 yet, on what basis do aliens qualify as a suspect class? Argua-
bly, alienage, unlike race, does not socially stigmatize in such a way
that a person cannot readily strip herself of the bondage. 149 Also con-
tributing to the uncertainty of aliens' qualification as a suspect class is
the question of whether aliens really constitute an identifiable
group. 150 For example, both the Dutch and Hispanics help to make
up the alien class, but in general, they receive very different treatment
at the hands of the government and society.151 This does not mean
that Dutch aliens do not experience any problems, but as a group
their difficulties pale in comparison to that of Hispanics. 152 Prejudice
and discrimination, therefore, seem to attach most readily, not to
alienage, but to place of national origin and ethnicity.15 a
The process theory provides a ready justification for including
aliens as discrete and insular minorities. Aliens, since they cannot
148. [T]he Court's decisions have established that classifications based on alienage,
like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close
judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a "discrete and
insular" minority [citing Footnote 4 from Carolene Products] for whom such
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate ....
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (footnote omitted); see also In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717 (1973) (invalidating a state court requirement of citizenship for admission to the
bar); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (invalidating a citizenship requirement for
jobs in a state civil service).
149. "[D]iscrete" means separate or distinct and "insular" means isolated or
detached. The words do not describe aliens as such .... [T]he phrase "discrete
and insular" applies to groups that are not embraced within the bond of
community kinship but are held at arm's length by the group or groups that
possess dominant political and economic power.
Lusky, supra note 89, at 1105 n.72. Ackerman accepts Lusky's characterization of "discrete
and insular" while objecting to Lusky's dismissal of Carolene Products' protection to aliens.
Ackerman sees aliens as covered by Paragraph 2 of Footnote 4 of Carolene Products. See
Ackerman, supra note 104, at 729 n.27.
150. See Lopez, Mexican Migration, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 698-700 (1981) (arguing that
the United States government owes a special obligation to Mexicans that it does not owe to
other groups, such as citizens from Pakistan).
151. See J. HENSLIN, supra note 147.
Hispanics are about two and a half times as likely as Anglos to be poor. The
median income of Hi'panic families is only about two thirds that of Anglos, their
unemployment rate is a third higher, and, compared with the general population,
Hispanics are only half as likely to work at white-collar jobs. In addition, they
are about four times as likely to live in overcrowded and deteriorating housing.
Id. at 107.
152. Id.; see also HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS (1980).
153. Note that a similar argument could apply, in part, to any social group. A social group
consists of many subgroups, some of which are more subjugated than others. Race differs in
degree, if not in kind, from alienage since it is difficult to imagine any subgroup among Blacks,
in constrast to aliens, which does not experience some form of subjugation, other than that
affecting voting rights.
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vote,I54 by definition have no direct representation in the legislative
process. Therefore, the theory goes, the courts should take special
pains to protect aliens who have no opportunity to protect their own
interests within the legislative process."' Aliens present a near per-
fect example of a minority left out of the electoral process.
Nevertheless, the argument reveals problems (none of which are
fatal) in the process model; in specific instances aliens may, as a mat-
ter of fact, have certain of their interests represented by legislators
who may be sympathetic to their plight. 156 Furthermore, the process
model may base aliens' protection on too general of a principle by
treating the group as a whole rather than as a divisible entity. For
example, the harm may occur at a lower level of group abstraction,
affecting only certain kinds of aliens, e.g., Cambodian boat people,
rather than aliens in general. In other words, the alienage problem
may need more of the tools of social analysis. To understand fully the
plight of aliens, it may help to subdivide the alien class into social
subgroups.
In Plyer v. Doe, 57 the Court struggled with the problem of how
fully to analyze the concept of aliens. The Court struck down a Texas
statute that denied educational funding for illegal aliens. 58 Although
the Court rejected treating all illegal aliens as a suspect class, 159 it
toyed with the idea of placing illegal alien children under that
rubric."o This middle level of abstraction, halfway between aliens in
general and specific members of the alien class, may serve as the opti-
mal place to invoke the social analysis. The middle level strategy
would be to find the lowest level of group abstraction (for example,
illegal alien children in Plyer) that includes those group members suf-
fering the most group harm. Accordingly, the Court could offer pro-
tection to those most harmed by the classification.
Despite the above problems, the Court should retain alienage as
a suspect class because aliens do make up a group that cannot protect
themselves in certain ways from the majoritiarian or interest group
154. Brilmayer notes that several states allowed aliens to vote early in this country's history
but that by 1928 aliens could not vote in any state. See Brilmayer, supra note 94, at 1318 n.83.
155. See generally Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the
National Government, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 275.
156. In 1986, Congress enacted a number of immigration reforms. See Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, P.L. 99-603, § 102, 100 Stat. 3359. For example, "intending
citizens" are protected against employment discrimination based on their lack of citizenship.
For a discussion, see M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 237-39 (1988).
157. 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
158. Id. at 230.
159. Id. at 219.
160. Id. at 219-23.
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political process, as they are barred by virtue of their group identity.
However, if alienage remains a suspect class, then many other groups
should also qualify. While the process model provides a fair defense
for retaining alienage as a suspect class, it does a less admirable job in
its treatment of gender. Perhaps this explains why, with gender, the
Court has deviated from the process model.
3. GENDER
Gender creates problems for the process model because women
constitute a majority, or, at least a near majority, of the electorate. 
161
Protecting a majority with a doctrine that seems to require that the
protected group be a "discrete and insular" minority presents a prob-
lem for the Court. This paradox offers the clearest proof yet that pro-
tection should be based on a social theory rather than on a process
theory. Women deserve special concern not because of their minority
status, provided that case could be made, but because of their status
as a social group.
The Court's recognition of gender as a suspect classification still
does not guarantee a great deal of judicial protection. The Court's
analysis in Geduldig v. Aiello, 16 2 illustrates the limits of judicial pro-
tection for gender. It also demonstrates the problems the Court cre-
ates when it focuses on suspect classifications rather than suspect
classes. In Geduldig, the Court held that exclusion of "disability that
accompanies normal pregnancy and childbirth" from California's dis-
ability insurance system "does not exclude [anyone] because of gen-
der." 163  The Court reasoned that the insurance plan divided
recipients into two groups, pregnant women and nonpregnant per-
sons.1" Because women fell on both sides of the divide, the Court
concluded that this case failed to demonstrate discrimination against
women. 165  The discrimination may more properly lie with the
Court's failure to acknowledge that only women get pregnant.
166
Furthermore, suspect class status came rather recently for
women; the Court did not recognize the suspect status of gender until
161. For example, in the 1976 presidential election, more women voted than men. See J.
EVANS, USA, IN THE POLITICS OF THE SECOND ELECTORATE 40 (J. Lovenduski & J. Hills
eds. 1984 at 40).
162. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
163. Id. at 496 n.20.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Congress subsequently amended Title VII in order to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy. See Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076-77.
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the 1970's.167 Although gender does not fit as neatly under the sus-
pect class label as does race, it does merit at least quasi-suspect class
status in the eyes of the Court.16
One positive aspect of the otherwise indefensibly belated recogni-
tion of suspect class status for women lies in the Court's implicit
acknowledgment that suspect classes have some fluidity to them.
This acknowledgment not only permits new classes, such as gender, to
emerge, but also raises many questions: How much social turmoil
and disruption is needed before a group may be given suspect class
status? Do social groups currently excluded from this protection,
such as homosexuals and the mentally retarded, need to exercise more
militancy or experience greater harm before they attain judicial pro-
tection? Or, can the Court ease social/political tension by granting
suspect class status before a great deal of social disruption has taken
place? Furthermore, do these inquiries take the Court far beyond its
legitimate role? In contrast to gender, illegitimacy does not raise such
troublesome questions, but its acceptance as a suspect class raises
other troubles.
4. ILLEGITIMACY
The term "illegitimacy" is value laden. For some, an illegitimate
child is living evidence of its parents' failure to live up to the moral
standard set by society. Accordingly, some commentators have
adopted the more neutral label, "nonmarital child."' 69 The Court,
however, persists in using the term illegitimacy. 170 The value laden
nature of the term should lend some force to the Court's treatment of
it as a suspect class. Presumably, the label "illegitimate" has a nega-
tive ring to it, because of how society discriminates against
illegitimates.
The Court, however, has vacillated on its treatment of illegiti-
macy as a suspect classification. It inches toward strict scrutiny in
167. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976),
reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
168. Although the [intermediate scrutiny] test [is] straightforward, it must be applied
free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females ....
[Thus], if the statutory objective is to exclude or "protect" members of one
gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be
innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.
See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
169. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 667-
75 (1986).
170. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
[Vol. 45:107
SUSPECT CLASS DEMOCRACY
some cases 171 and retreats toward a rational basis review in others. 17 2
The Court never reaches the heights or depths of either level of analy-
sis, and never fully treats illegitimacy as a suspect classification. This
ambivalence may in part be explained by the fact that the bearer of
the illegitimacy trait has no control over that trait, a factor which
argues for suspect class protection. And yet, illegitimates, unlike
racial minorities, women, and aliens,1 73 have never formally been
excluded from the legislative process, a factor which argues against
it. 174 Thus, illegimates, having an uncontrollable trait, and yet not
having been completely excluded from the political process, do not
quite fit under the process model's criteria of suspectness. However,
even within the terms of the process model, is illegitimacy any more
of an uncontrollable trait than, let us say, homosexuality or aging?
Arguably, it is not.
Illegitimacy defines the boundary line between what the Court
considers suspect (race, alienage, and gender) and what it classifies as
non-suspect. How justifiable is the Court's line of demarcation
between suspect and non-suspect classes? Does it make any sense to
draw the line at illegitimacy? I argue that if we accept the Court's
three or four suspect, or quasi-suspect, classifications, then we must
extend the list to include many more disadvantaged groups. What
other groups make good candidates for suspect class status despite the
Court's rulings?
5. NON-SUSPECT CLASSES
The Court has explicitly denied, or tacitly refused to consider,
the suspect class status of a number of social groups: the physically
171. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (striking down a Louisiana statute that
prohibited unacknowledged illegimate children from bringing a wrongful death action for their
mother's death).
172. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding an intestate succession
scheme that prevented even acknowledged illegitimate children from sharing in their father's
estate with legitimate children).
173. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 169, at 658.
174. Id. at 668-69.
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handicapped, 17 5 the mentally retarded, 176 the mentally ill,' 77 homo-
sexuals, 178 the aged, 179 and the poor. 8° Given the non-suspect status
of these groups and the contrary suspect classification of race, alien-
age, gender, and illegitimacy, the suspect/non-suspect class demarca-
tion makes little sense. For example, the mentally retarded fare as
badly, if not worse than aliens, on any indicia of suspectness. The
175. The Court has not discussed whether or not the physically handicapped qualify as a
suspect class. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (holding that a reduction in
hospital benefit coverage did not discriminate against the handicapped); Hendrick Hudson
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (holding that school need not provide a
hearing-impaired student with a sign-language interpreter); Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (noting that college could refuse to admit a prospective nursing
student with a hearing impairment when it would not be possible for her to participate without
the school taking affirmative steps). These cases involved meaningful access and equalization
of burdens questions, but these issues may be only symptomatic of biases against the
handicapped. For an excellent argument in favor of giving the handicapped suspect class
status, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 16-31, at 1594-98 (2d ed. 1988).
176. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 444-45 (1985)
("[L]egislation thus singling out the retarded for special treatment reflects the real and
undeniable differences between the retarded and others [and] it would be difficult to find a
principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups . . .who can claim some degree of
prejudice."). It is clear that the Court fears a "slippery slope," i.e., that admitting too many
groups as suspect classes would open the floodgates. I offer an analysis that expands the list of
suspect classes, but in a way that sets limits on the number qualifying.
177. Although the problem of the suspect class status of the mentally ill has been raised in
cases such as Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981), the Court has refused fully to consider
the issue. See Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974). The
Court, in City of Cleburne, mentioned "the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the
infirm" as examples of candidates for suspect class analysis that the Court would have to
consider if it accepted mental retardation as a suspect class. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 444.
While this is dicta, it does indicates that the Court will probably not grant the mentally ill, or
any of the others mentioned, suspect class status.
178. The Court, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986), devoted a great deal
of the opinion to the historical disapproval of homosexuality. This history would seem to
justify according suspect class status, rather than to justify denying it. The Court's acceptance
of this history of disapproval as valid does not bode well for the prospects of having
homosexuals deemed a suspect class.
179. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (finding old age not
to be a suspect classification, since most legislators and voters will someday be old). "(Old age]
marks a stage that each of us will reach, if we live out our normal life span." Id. at 313-14.
180. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) ("[T]his Court has never held that
financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis."). In
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 459 (1973),
the Court described the alleged suspect class as "a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified
only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth
than other districts." Id. at 28. Given that these were inner city residents of San Antonio in
the poorest school districts, with a student population of 90% Mexican-American and 6%
Negro, I, unlike the Court, have no hesitancy in calling these residents "poor." But the Court
found that the poor in this case had none of the traditional indicia of suspectnesss. Id. at 19 &
28. The Court found that these groups had no disabilities, no history of unequal treatment,
and no political powerlessness. Id. at 28. Such a finding is startling. Furthermore, with these
statistics, it seems that the Court could have found that the legislation had a racial motivation.
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mentally retarded have a long history of discrimination and oppres-
sion,1 8 1 whereas not all aliens, e.g., the Norweigians, can justifiably
construct a social history of group harm. Further, retardation can
more easily meet the standards of immutability than can alienage.
The Court has failed to develop a single, coherent theory to
determine suspect class status. However, a plausible set of suspect
classes may be gleaned from the opinions of the various Justices, writ-
ing both for the majority and for the dissent. In the next Section, I
have freely drawn upon these opinions to construct a theory of sus-
pect classification and classes which may be used more fairly and
coherently than the Court's theories. The objective is not to criticize
the Court from a higher moral plateau, but rather to suggest some
concerns critical for democracy itself.
IV. CONSTRUCTING A SOCIAL THEORY
The various cases in which the Court has considered whether or
not a class qualifies as suspect leave the Court's analysis in disarray.
The Court uses a mixture of criteria to determine suspectness, creat-
ing an analytical muddle, and the boundary line between suspect
classes and non-suspect classes is drawn in a haphazard way. Thus,
the process model fails to provide a coherent and viable framework
for the Court's suspect class analysis. Perhaps we should look at
attempts to unify the morass by adopting some principles that, consis-
tent with many of the Court's opinions, prescribe what the Court
ought to do. No one philosophy or analysis exclusively dominates the
Court's opinions in the equal protection area (although the process
model comes closest). Yet, a look at the Court's opinions reveals
some dominant strains. I want to examine two influential proposals,
namely, the anti-discrimination and the anti-subjugation principles.
The arguments will show the merits of adopting the latter.
Professor Brest sees the Court as going beyond the neutral prin-
ciples mandated by the process model' 82 and adopting a substantive
anti-discrimination principle,' 83 which "disfavors race-dependent
181. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461-65 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment and
dissenting in part) (describing the history of discrimination suffered by mentally retarded).
182. Brest, Forward: In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1976). It is somewhat misleading to describe the process model as advocating neutrality for it
does promote at least one positive value, participation in the governmental system through
electing representatives. See J. ELY, supra note 13, at 74-75.
183. The classical formulation of the anti-discrimination principle is found in Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). For an exhaustive
critique of this use of the anti-discrimination principle, see Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 107, 108-46 (1976).
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decisions and conduct-at least when either selectively disadvantages
the members of minority groups. "184 The anti-discrimination princi-
ple shares some things with the process model."8 5 Like the process
model, the anti-discrimination principle places the focus on the perpe-
trator of the discrimination and not on the disparate impact felt by
the disadvantaged group.8 6 Unlike the process model, the anti-dis-
crimination principle makes no pretense of neutrality.
In contrast to Brest's anti-discrimination principle, Professor
Tribe proposes an anti-subjugation principle, 8 7 "which aims to break
down legally created or legally reenforced systems of subordination
that treat some people as second-class citizens."'' 8  The anti-discrimi-
nation principle emphasizes the biased mind of the perpetrator,
whereas the anti-subjugation principle looks at the burdens placed
upon suspect groups.' 89 The moral justification for the anti-subjuga-
tion principle lies in the claim that it is wrong to have entire social
groups subjugated, whether or not that subjugation is the result of
bias.
The following discussion illustrates the differences between the
anti-discrimination and anti-subjugation principles. If a legislature
implemented a reapportionment plan that seriously diluted Black vot-
ing strength, the anti-discrimination principle would support a finding
that was unconstitutional only if racial prejudice on the part of legis-
lators could be shown. By contrast, if the plan closed out the election
of minority candidates, the anti-subjugation principle would hold the
plan unconstitutional, irrespective of the legislators' intent. In City of
184. See Brest, supra note 182, at 7.
185. See id. at 1-5. Brest provides a number of examples of cases decided according to the
anti-discrimination principle, beginning with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
He also cites Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) ("requiring that government agencies
remedy their past discriminatory selection of public housing sites by consciously locating
future projects in predominantly White neighborhoods"). Brest, supra note 182, at 3.
186. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), nicely illustrates the Court's adoption of
the anti-discrimination principle. In that case, the Court upheld an employment testing
device, because discriminatory intent was not proven, despite the test's disparate impact on
Black candidates for jobs as police officers in Washington, D.C. Id. at 245-46.
187. See also Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986).
188. L. TRIBE, supra note 175, at 1515.
189. Id. at 1516-19. According to Tribe:
[S]trict judicial scrutiny would be reserved for those government acts that, given
their history, context, source, and effect, seem most likely not only to perpetuate
subordination but also to reflect a tradition of hostility toward an historically





Mobile v. Bolden, 190 the Court adopted the anti-discrimination
approach and upheld a multimember district apportionment plan, the
effect of which was to freeze out Blacks, because no discriminatory
intent on the part of the legislators could be found.1 91
This case illustrates that the anti-subjugation principle has dis-
tinct advantages over the anti-discrimination principle, primarily
because the former has a greater positive effect on democracy than the
latter. Subjugation covers a broader array of harms that are relevant
to democratic participation than does discrimination. Without a
doubt, discrimination on the part of legislators undermines democ-
racy, for their legislation becomes tainted by their prejudice; however,
the subjugation of certain social groups poses even more serious chal-
lenges to democracy than does legislative discrimination. Democracy
presupposes first-class citizenship for all of "the people." Second-
class citizens are not fully "citizens" of the society. The sheer fact of
their existence as second-class citizens undermines the very essence of
democracy. Even if legislative discrimination disappeared, subjuga-
tion would remain and no true democracy can tolerate this.
Moreover, the anti-subjugation principle serves to unify what
might seem like widely disparate factors used by the Court in deter-
mining the existence of a suspect class. Before showing the unifying
effect of the anti-subjugation principle, the factors need to be com-
bined into more manageable sub-categories. The Court has referred
to various criteria that a social group needs to satisfy in order to qual-
ify for suspect class status, including discreteness and insularity,
immutability, political powerlessness, stereotypes, and obvious badges
of inferiority. 1 92 The factors lie about in a hodgepodge within the var-
ious opinions of the Justices. None of the factors cited are alone suffi-
cient conditions for suspectness. However, if the factors are put
together in a unifying framework, their constellation constitutes an
adequate set for suspect class analysis. One point that has befuddled
the Court and its analysts is that these factors do not seem to fit into a
clear and neat analytical framework. 193 However, group identity,
group harm, and political/social powerlessness provide that clear-cut
analytical framework. 94 Still, the main factors do not separate out
190. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
191. Id. at 65.
192. See supra notes 83-144 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Note, Suspect Classifications, supra note 11, at 428 ("Although the Court has
provided an inexhaustive list of factors that indicate suspectness, it has never enunciated a
workable definition. Nor has the Court stated the method by which these factors determine
suspectness.").
194. These factors parallel those set forth in Fiss, supra note 183, at 154-55. A great deal of
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into isolated units. Rather, they are interdependent and mutually
reinforcing.
Group identity transpires through the largely negative social rec-
ognition of relatively immutable and irrelevant traits. Group identity
and its aspects, immutability and irrelevancy, cannot be analytically
separated from group harm and political/social powerlessness. All
three factors-group identity, group harm, and political/social
powerlessness--combine through the force of the anti-subjugation
principle. A group attains aspects of its identification, gets harmed




Discrete and insular minorities should be interpreted in terms of
social groups. Professor Fiss proposes to interpret the equal protec-
tion clause not in terms of unfair treatment but rather in terms of
group disadvantaging. 95 In some sense, my proposal extends the Fiss
formula. What is a social group? Fiss characterizes a social group as
an interdependent entity, such that the identity and well-being of its
members are linked to the identity and well-being of the group.1 96
While Fiss admits that working with a concept of groups is "problem-
atic" and "messy,''97 he overestimates the difficulty, for society in
many respects has already done some of the "messy" work by defining
disadvantaged groups. In many ways, the members of a social group
define their own group. However, the group's own means of group
identification should not be the Court's primary focus. The Court's
concern should not center around the positive modes of group identi-
fication, but should focus rather on the negative ways in which outsid-
ers define the group in question. Blacks, women, and gays, for
example, often do define themselves in terms of group membership,
sometimes negatively, sometimes positively. There is, however,
another dynamic of group definition at work, coming in negative
ways, from outside the group. The Court's role operates foremost
with respect to this latter force.
The Court should concentrate on group harm, not on group
development. The phenomenon of group development begins when
the discussion in this Section could be seen as an elaboration on the Fiss formulation, although
there are some important differences.
195. See id. at 147.
196. See id. at 148.
197. Id. at 149.
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members of a group engage in a search for a group identity. Should
the Court aid this process? The group development strategy places
the Court on a slippery slope that the group harm strategy largely can
avoid. By focusing on group development, courts face insuperable
difficulties in differentiating those groups worthy of development,
from those not worthy, and in deciphering the degree of protection
needed. If they used a group harm analysis, the courts would engage
in a far simpler assessment, by determining which groups occupy the
bottom rungs of the social hierarchy.
For example, under a group development scheme, a group form-
ing an intentional community would warrant considerable judicial
concern with respect to certain types of zoning ordinances. This cre-
ates problems. How does a court choose which groups deserve protec-
tion? For example, would the Survivalist qualify for any more
protection than the Anti-Vivisection League? 9 ' The group develop-
ment strategy would seem to require courts to make fine distinctions
between groups without providing any criteria for those distinctions.
On the group harm analysis, by contrast, more than a few instances of
group harm would be required in order for a group to qualify for
special protection. Accordingly, the courts might step in to prevent
further harm against a lesbian separatist commune based on levels of
harm experienced, but not to prevent impediments to the group for-
mation of the Survivalist or Anti-Vivisection League.
The distinction between the group development analysis and the
group harm analysis reveals itself as problematic in Professor
Michelman's recent analysis of Bowers v. Hardwick.'99 According to
Michelman, the Georgia anti-sodomy law, in effect, denies citizenship
to homosexuals. 2" The Court, according to Michelman, should have
listened in that case to the highly audible sounds of a group undertak-
ing its own definition. In that manner, the Court, by affirming the
virtues of group identity, would validate group identity.2"'
198. For purposes of these examples, we need not know very much about the Survivalist or
the Anti-Vivisectionist. That is part of the point of the analysis. The past and current
notoriety of harm done to homosexuals makes them easier to identify as a group than the
Survivalists or Anti-Vivisectionists.
199. See Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (analyzing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
200. Id. at 1533.
201. Michelman speaks of homosexuality as a "personally constitutive and distinctive way,
or ways, of being." See id. at 1533. I would defend this reading of Michelman's article, but his
claim is taken somewhat out of context. Similar to mine, Michelman's analysis resides within
a democratic theory. His concern is to counter the privacy rationale for homosexuality. He
overemphasizes the group identity aspect of homosexuality in order to show the limits of a
privacy justification for homosexuality wherein homosexuality is treated as a matter of
subjective taste; Michelman wants to demonstrate that homosexuality is more than a matter of
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Yet, group harm, not group identity, should have been the main
concern of the Court in Bowers. Outsiders, including the Georgia leg-
islature, have helped to define homosexuality, at least that portion of
homosexuality that should concern the Court.2 02 Whatever the Geor-
gia legislature has said about homosexual identity, its statement about
group disadvantage rings loud and clear. The Court, in general, needs
to interpret the legislation in light of its disparate impact on disadvan-
taged social groups.203 People should be able to engage in sexual
practices with members of their own gender "so that they may avoid
being forced into an identity, not because they are defining their identi-
ties through the decision itself."2° 4
Nevertheless, a number of commentators employ the group
development or identity strategy. For example, in defending homo-
sexuality as a suspect class, one analyst writes: "the group's defining
characteristic must be one essential to personhood."20 5 Yet, members
of a suspect class need not view their group membership as important
to their own personal identity. 2°6 What of those members of groups,
as defined by outsiders, who do not want to identify with the group?
If they do not take pride in their group identity, does that disqualify
them from the protection of suspect class status? Surely not. While
Black or gay pride may have positive aspects of group identification
for many members of those groups, for others, the pride may serve
more as a defensive shield than as a positive value.
Group identity, at least with respect to those groups making up
the suspect classes, is socially determined, and that social "judgment"
is primarily a negative one. Thus, for example, a Black child finds
herself defined as part of a "group," the contours of which are exter-
individual whim. Id. My point is that it should not matter for a suspect class analysis whether
homosexuality is a matter of subjective preference, or whether it is a matter of group identity.
202. The Georgia Code interpreted by the Court in Bowers, read in pertinent part, as
follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
[another].
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 [years].
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.l (1986) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
203. The Court in Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979), allowed
for disparate impact as proof of intent. If no other proof is required, that would presage the
merging of the two.
204. Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 782 (1989) ("Resisting an
enforced identity is not the same as defining oneself.").
205. Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1300 (1985).
206. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 204, at 780 ("Homosexuality is first understood as a
central, definitive element of a person's identity only from the standpoint of its 'deviancy.' ").
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nally described and therefore generally negative. What makes group
identification within a suspect class unique is that group membership
considerations do not stand alone. It is directly relevant to the harm,
or the negative forces to which members are subjected. It may be
accurate to say that a sign of a suspect class is when the process of
group identification is part and parcel of the process of group harm.
In addition, her group membership makes little sense to her when
severed from considerations of the political and social powerlessness,
which are also the consequences of membership in that group. Label-
ling groups and subjugating groups thus begins to merge. So, what
makes group identity unique in the context of a suspect class is, in
part, the connection between group identity and the other factors,
group harm and social/political powerlessness.
2. IMMUTABILITY
At times, various members of the Court have emphasized the
immutable nature of a particular trait in terms of whether the posses-
sors of such a trait deserve suspect class status.2"7 A trait is immuta-
ble if the individual has little or no control over it.20  Thus, racial and
gender characteristics constitute immutable traits, whereas, for exam-
ple alienage does not. A person cannot change her race, but, presum-
ably an individual can become a citizen. Once an individual is placed
in a racial social group, there is little that the individual can do to
disconfirm the classification.
However, like any of the factors enumerated here, immutability
is not a sufficient condition for qualifying a group as a suspect class.2°9
Eye color is immutable, and yet the blue-eyed hardly qualify as a dis-
crete and insular minority. Nor, strictly speaking, does immutability
constitute a necessary condition of suspectness. The Court accepts
207. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (Brennan, J.); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 108-09
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944), reh'g
denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945); see also Sherry, supra note 25, at 113-14.
208. The Court, in rejecting strict scrutiny for illegitimacy, nevertheless stated that "the
legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic
determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no
relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society." Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976). However, this seems to confuse the cause of the trait with the
trait itself. Control over the cause of the trait is not critical for race as a suspect classification.
If that were the concern, then many more traits would factor into a suspect class analysis. Few
of us have much control over many of our traits. The important factor is the immutability of
the trait itself, not the immutability of the causes of the trait.
209. L. TRIBE, supra note 175, at 1073. Tribe lists "intelligence, height, and strength" as
immutable characteristics for a given individual.
19901
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
alienage as a suspect class, 210 and yet, a person can change her status
as an alien, at times with relative ease.
The existence of immutable traits such as physical strength,
height, and intelligence,21' that seem inapplicable to suspect class
analysis, do not, however, necessarily undermine the use of other, rel-
evant immutable traits, such as race, for purposes of suspect class
determinations. Immutability is both a factor in determining suspect-
ness and is, in turn, determined by suspectness. Racial characteris-
tics, for example, become more intelligible when placed in the context
of the harm and oppression experienced by the racial minority. Simi-
larly, treating intelligence as an immutable characteristic takes on a
new meaning in light of the racism often associated with proposals
pushing the virtues of intelligence measures.212 Race and intelligence
are not easily isolated, scientific concepts. Race does not provide a
value-free, objective, biological means of identifying an individual.
Race comes complete with its value laden, social baggage, which sci-
ence cannot discard. So, the immutability of a trait is, in part, deter-
mined by its social entrenchment.
Moreover, immutability comes in degrees. This statement may
seem odd, for "immutable" implies incapable of change. However,
very few traits are immutable in the strict sense of the word. Most
traits, including sex, are subject to change; some more than others.
Furthermore, some traits, such as age, may be immutable in one sense
(one can never grow younger), and not in another (one does continue
to age, so no one is fixed at a particular age).
Because immutability fails as a sufficient and necessary condition
of suspectness, some commentators have tended to dismiss it alto-
gether.213 But because immutability cannot do the job alone does not
imply that it cannot do any job at all. Immutability plays an impor-
tant role in suspect class analysis. Intuitively, all other things being
equal, a person who is harmed because of an immutable trait deserves
more moral and legal concern than one harmed because of a mutable
trait. In general, Blacks are worse off than members of the Commu-
nist Party because of the immutability of racial characteristics relative
210. See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
211. L. TRIBE, supra note 175, at 1073 n.51; see also J. ELY, supra note 13, at 150. Tribe
and Ely both use physical strength, height, and intelligence as examples of immutable
characteristics that fail as unconstitutional bases for classification. In a strict sense, I find it
difficult to accept all but gross phenotypic traits as immutable. One would be hard pressed to
find any clear and uncontroversial sense of intelligence. But cf Note, Equal Protection and
Intelligence Classifications, 26 STAN. L. REV. 647, 650 (1974) (discussing "potential standards
for the adjudication of equal protection challenges to intelligence classifications").
212. See S. ROSE, L. KAMIN & R. LEWONTIN, NOT IN OUR GENES 83-129 (1984).
213. See L. TRIBE, supra note 175, at 1073 n.51.
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to the mutability of political affiliation.214 A person can change polit-
ical affiliation with much greater ease than race. Thus, immutability
helps grade social groups in terms of the degree of protection they
may require.
3. IRRELEVANCE
In assessing the potential suspect nature of a social group, the
Court may also consider the irrelevance of the distinguishing trait.21 5
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the meaning of irrelevancy,
including the following two senses: whether a trait is relevant or irrel-
evant to a classificatory scheme, versus whether a trait is relevant or
irrelevant to a legislative purpose or public policy. 2 16 When invoking
the first sense of irrelevancy, the Court sometimes discusses the rele-
vance of a characteristic to the classification drawn in the legislation
under review.21 7 Professor Sherry contends that this accounts for the
debate between Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun in Toll v.
Moreno218 over whether "the characteristic of alienage was relevant
to the statutory purpose of providing educational benefits to
residents.
'21 9
The classification sense of irrelevancy, however, runs into
problems. For example, mental retardation may be highly relevant to
a zoning classification. Yet, as Justice Marshall noted in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. ,220 a case involving just such
a classification, retardation should not be relevant to whether a person
can live in a certain area. To support this we might appeal to the
empirical claim that there is no evidence that the presence of mentally
retarded people makes a neighborhood more unsafe. Similarly, race
and gender are irrelevant to the question of voting.
The second, more empirically defensible sense of irrelevancy is
that characteristics used in defining group membership are irrelevant
to the determination in question. Even this sense of irrelevancy, how-
214. This statement says nothing about first amendment protections for political activists
and others. I think that these protections should be considerably stronger than they are at
present. Suspect class analysis, however, does not address these concerns.
215. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 22 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
also Sherry, supra note 25, at 111-13.
216. See Sherry, supra note 25, at 111-13.
217. Id.
218. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
219. See Sherry, supra note 25, at 111. Justice Rehnquist asked whether alienage was a
constitutionally relevant classification. Toll, 458 U.S. at 41-42. Justice Blackman inquired
whether alienage was relevant to the purpose of the legislation. Id. at 22.
220. 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ever, does not adequately differentiate between, for example, plumb-
ers, aliens, and Blacks, each being denied some public good such as
in-state tuition. There is something worse about denying the benefit
to Blacks than to plumbers, even though race and occupation are
equally irrelevant in determining eligibility for the benefit.
This example, however, highlights the real issue which the
Court, in its discussion of irrelevance, seeks to counter. There is an
implicit judgment about the moral worth of the members of the group
in question on the basis of their group identity when legislation is
intended to have a discriminatory impact. The irrelevancy of the
characteristic in question to the discriminatory purpose demonstrates
the negativity of the group identification. When, as in Cleburne, a law
discriminates against the mentally retarded by making it legal to bar
them from a particular neighborhood, it implies a moral judgment
that the retarded are lesser human beings, unworthy of living next
door to the rest of us. This third, moral sense of irrelevancy should
play a critical role in evaluating a piece of legislation. Legislation that
has more of a negative impact on Blacks than on plumbers says some-
thing about how legislators judge the moral worth of Blacks. The
irrelevance inquiry provides a means for challenging such improper
moral evaluations. Denigration of a person's moral Worth because of
that person's group identity helps unleash the forces of subjugation.
B. "Group" Harm
Individuals experience harm in the context of forces operating
externally to the group. Those external forces consist, in part, of peo-
ple outside the group who have defined the group. When outsiders
define the group in exclusively negative ways, and when membership
in a particular group is not self-determined but other-determined,
individual members are wronged. The wrong may occur either
through physical violence or through thwarting the individual's aspi-
rations. Those aspirations are best understood in the context of that
person's group identity. This does not mean that the aspirations of
members of racial minorities are different in kind than those of other
social groups. Their aspirations, however, cannot avoid being inter-
mingled with the group identity society has forced upon them.22" '
While the harm has immediate impact on the individual, the
harm also connects with the oppression of the group. Oppression has
structural features including the "vast network of everyday practices,
attitudes, assumptions, behaviors, and institutional rules." '222 The
221. See, e.g., Micheiman, supra note 199, at 1532-37.
222. Young, The Five Faces of Oppression, 14 PHIL. F. 273, 275 (1988).
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harm that befalls the individual gets entangled in structural features
involving the group.223 These structural features, in turn, become
more deeply embedded through the passage of time.224 Thus, a his-
tory of oppression exacerbates the harm. Although one can conceive
of animosity against a group suddenly springing up, despite very little
historical precedent, a far more likely scenario comes from the now
all too familiar account of a social group's oppression throughout a
historical period. The case for a group's harm depends upon how
good a case one can make for the historical and structural features of
the group's suffering.
Group harm is a comparative concept. The group harm of a sus-
pect class exists relative to its opposite social group. The disadvan-
tage of homosexuality only becomes apparent relative to the privilege
of heterosexuality. The Court needs to take into account the disparity
between the privilege of heterosexuality and the harm perpetrated
against homosexuals. It may be that the disparity between heterosex-
uals and homosexuals is greater than the disparity between citizens
and resident aliens. Homosexuals often face considerable hostility.225
In contrast, many aliens, particularly those with green cards, suffer
fewer disabilities and little or no hostility relative to the status of citi-
zens. 226 Groups become stigmatized by and with an identity attached
to them through the harm perpetrated on them. This occurs within a
political and social context.
C. Political/Social Powerlessness
A member of a social group eligible for suspect class status not
only finds herself socially stigmatized, but also having few, if any, ave-
nues of rectification. As discussed above, 227 process model theorists
have followed the lead of democratic theorists in narrowly construing
the avenues of rectification. For them, the political process becomes
primarily associated with electoral politics. Yet, the power to subju-
223. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 95. "But when the oppression of a minority comes to
constitute the essence of those politics or-still worse-when the constitutional structure for
political activity has been arranged to facilitate the pattern of oppression, judicial intervention
will necessarily entail inefficacy or a compromise of the constitutional structure itself." Id. at
1304. See id. at 1304 n.54 for examples of structural patterns of racism.
224. The Court has occasionally used history as a standard for determining suspect
classifications. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
225. "There are indications that homosexuals face increasing hostility and even violence."
J. HENSLIN, supra note 147, at 81. An understatement, to say the least.
226. For a detailed comparison of different types of aliens, see HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS (1980).
227. See supra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
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gate does not operate only through the legislature. Power diffuses
throughout society. Correlatively, powerlessness takes hold in the
same diffuse manner.228
The process model characterizes the role of the judiciary as that
of freeing the bottlenecks in the political, electoral process. 229 The
social model, in contrast, incorporates that aspect of the process
model while recognizing the limitations of that model in narrowly
construing what constitutes the "bottlenecks," i.e., the obstacles to
democracy. Viewed from the perspective of the social model, these
bottlenecks operate far in advance of those most immediately block-
ing the electoral process, because the "social" incorporates the whole
terrain in front of the political process-the social, economic, and cul-
tural turf that one must cross before getting to formal government
structure or matters such as voting. That terrain becomes clearer
when seen through the eyes of group identity and group harm.
In sum, rough measures exist for each group factor: identity,
harm, and powerlessness. Yet, final judgment concerning a group's
suspectness must await the composite, when all of the factors interact.
The composite of factors does not provide any mechanical test.
Rather it provides a narrative. Calling it a "narrative," however, does
not thereby imply that it is entirely arbitrary. The narrative that
emerges, for example, with respect to the Jewish people is far stronger
than one constructed about the Neo-Nazis. After analyzing and
accepting the narrative, the judge, or trier of fact, should need little
more convincing beyond admitting the variable factors discussed
below.
D. Mitigating Factors
Each of the above characteristics-group identity, group harm,
and political/social powerlessness-manifests itself to varying
degrees. The ties of the first, group identity, vary depending on the
group. The key amplifying factor with respect to group identity lies
in the immutability factor. The less control an individual has over the
trait used to pinpoint group identity, the more concern, other things
being equal, the courts should have for the suspect class in question.
228. Power and powerlessness can operate at a psychological level through the use of
language. An adult women called "girl," or an adult Black male called "boy," can internalize
that label in a way that will seriously mold subsequent action. Power can also manifest itself
both internally and externally. Individuals or groups may conform their behavior according to
how any external threat is perceived or misperceived. This internalization of a sense of
powerlessness may or may not be the product of conscious thought. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT,
POWER/KNOWLEDGE (1980).
229. See supra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
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An individual has less control over racial characteristics than over
those involving sexual preference or political affiliation.230 Courts
should therefore manifest greater concern for legislation impacting on
racial minorities than on homosexuals or communists.231
The underlying proposition at stake here is that we ought to give
more protection to people who suffer due to traits over which they
have little or no control than to people who suffer because of a trait
over which they do have some degree of control. In making this
assessment, it is important to hold other things equal. That is to say,
if Group A was identified in terms of immutable traits and Group B
was not, but Group B suffered far more harm than Group A, then,
since other things would not be equal, the above analysis would not
apply. This does not imply that immutability is a more important
factor than group harm. It does mean that when group harms are
roughly equivalent with respect to two groups, then (and only then)
would immutability come into play as a means of relegating more
judicial concern to one group than to the other.
In addition, group harm can also vary from group to group.
Groups that can make a case for deeply embedded structural oppres-
sion that has a long, sordid history, such as Blacks, should be raised
along the degrees of suspectness. In contrast to racial minorities, ille-
gitimates would be hard pressed to make as telling a case of structural
oppression over the centuries.
Groups also vary with respect to their political and social
powerlessness. Jews probably wield considerably more political
power than, for example, the mentally retarded. Differential power
relations would not thereby exclude Jews in this example from suspect
class status, but relative power does need to be taken into account.
Moreover, this part of the analysis would necessarily assess the rela-
tionship between political and social powerlessness.
The final varying factor is the polycentric nature of some suspect
classes. Some individuals qualify for higher levels of suspectness
because they belong to overlapping suspect classes, for example, race
and gender.232 Another factor that has a particularly strong amplify-
230. I do not mean to imply that sexual preference is simply a matter of taste and
inclination, which an individual can easily modify. An individual may, well have little control
over homosexuality. The point is, however, that an individual can usually mask or change
sexual preference effectively in a way that she could not change her race. If I am wrong on this
assessment, then homosexuality begins to look more like race. This admission, however,
would not affect the overall framework of the analysis.
231. Again, this statement is not intended to apply to first amendment protections for
political activists and others.
232. Hochschild, Race, Class, Power, and the American Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY AND
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ing effect is poverty.233 One's ability to control the group identifying
trait, to thwart the externally imposed group "identity," to offset
political and social powerlessness, relates directly to poverty.
234
Moreover, for some, poverty closely resembles an immutable charac-
teristic in that for generations certain subclasses have been unable to
escape the pernicious effects of poverty. While the courts have been
adamantly opposed to treating wealth classifications as suspect, 235 the
amplifying effects of poverty cannot be denied.
2 36
Poverty presents an interesting problem, as was noted in the dis-
cussion of Locke, who like so many democratic theorists excluded the
poor from effective political participation.237 Poverty can infect every
other suspect class, regardless of which social groups make the sus-
pect class list. The situation of racial minorities, aliens, women,
homosexuals, and the mentally retarded, can only become worse
through poverty. Poverty makes it more difficult to escape group
identity, to avoid group harm, and to rectify political and social
powerlessness. 23' Thus, even if poverty is kept off the list of suspect
classes,239 its role as an amplifier makes it a subject of grave concern.
THE WELFARE STATE 157, 159 (A. Gutmann ed. 1988) ("Inequalities of race, class, and power
cumulate, and their combination worsens the disparties created by each dimension alone.").
233. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
235. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 411 U.S.
959 (1973).
236. During the Warren Court era, it seemed likely that wealth would be treated as a
suspect classification. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (ruling that
once a state granted a right to vote, it could not impair that right through a poll tax, since the
ability to vote has no relationship to wealth). However, in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,
141 (1971), the Court explicitly denied that a wealth classification would trigger heightened
scrutiny.
237. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
238. See J. HENSLIN, supra note 147, at 256-57.
239. The issue hinges on group identity, i.e., whether those in poverty constitute a cohesive
group. See, e.g., Kalven, Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 129
(1972) ("The poor seem to be a less cohesive and less readily identifiable group than are racial
minorities. Because the class of 'poor' is constantly in flux, the reinforced sense of stigma
which characterizes de jure racial classifications is probably mitgated even where explicit
wealth classifications are concerned."). Clune, however, states:
[Poverty] is one of the most startingly stable social phenomena (the stroke of
personal income have remained in uncannily stable ratios to each other for
decades); it seems totally immune to political attack or even war; the disabilities
and abilities associated with wealth are pervasive and among the most highly
important on our scale of values. [Whether] or not some individuals escape is
insignificant compared to those who do not. If the non-escapees are vulnerable
and weak economically, socially, and politically, their situation is identicdl to
another class whose individual members are less able to escape.
Clune, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth Discriminations Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 289, cited in W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S.
SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1272 n.G (1988).
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E. Applications
The individual factors-group identity, group harm, and polit-
ical/social powerlessness-do not provide a precise formula for
clearly determining if and when a social group qualifies as a suspect
class. Instead, the factors, along with the mitigating concerns, inter-
relate. The case or narrative for suspect class status must be con-
structed from the sum of these factors. The factors making up the
social model do not differ from those considered at one time or
another by the Court, but they do provide a different kind of unified
theory, namely, anti-subjugation, than that offered by the Court.
How does the suspect class analysis in terms of a social theory differ
from that now accepted by the courts? I have already provided some
examples. Here I can only indicate the general direction of a social
analysis.
Race serves as the paradigmatic suspect class under both analy-
ses. Race gets an even higher degree of concern under the proposed
suspect class analysis than under the Court's interpretation, since
poverty, so often directly linked with race, serves as a factor amplify-
ing suspectness. In fact, poverty often serves as a surrogate for racial
classifications.
Gender attains a more solid place amongst the suspect classes
under the social model than under the process model because of a
history of structural oppression. Feminist scholarship has played a
major role in revealing this history of the structural oppression of
women.2" Furthermore, the feminist movement has caused many
males to rethink their power relations to women. The presence of
political power denies the claim for a suspect class status for gender in
the process model. The social model interprets powerlessness more
broadly than the process model so that social powerlessness and the
lack of effective political representation offset any reputed gains in
opening up the political process for women.
Alienage and illegitimacy become more difficult to justify under
the social model than under the Court's analysis. Alienage fits quite
naturally under the process model since aliens, by definition, will be
unrepresented in the legislature to the extent that aliens cannot serve
in the legislature or vote for legislators. So, currently, the courts need
to treat any legislation dealing with alien classification with a high
degree of suspicion.241 Under the proposed suspect class analysis,
aliens do not get such a high level of judicial concern. Lack of
240. See, e.g., S. ROTHMAN, WOMEN'S PROPER PLACE (1978).
241. See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
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involvement in the political process-critical under the process
model 42 -becomes only one factor among many others under the
social model. Nevertheless, the process model does provide a solution
to the problem of aliens not having immediate access to the legisla-
ture. Under the process model aliens need special judicial protection
because they are, by definition, excluded from the political process.
The social model would do well to heed the progress made for aliens
under the process model.
Illegitimacy, on the other hand, seems very difficult to defend
within the social model, even as a quasi-suspect class. In the eyes of
the process model, illegitimates can become involved in the political
process,243 and today the label of illegitimacy has less stigma attached
to it than was true previously. 2" A social analysis of illegitimacy may
be even less receptive to illegitimates as a suspect class. The group
identity of illegitimates is not particularly strong, nor is the group
harm especially devastating. Illegitimacy takes on more of the char-
acteristics of a suspect class in light of its overlap polycentricity with
other, more clearly designated, suspect classes, e.g., race, and relative
to mitigating factors such as poverty. A social analysis would readily
adopt poor, Black, illegitimates as a suspect class, but not wealthy,
White, illegitimates.
Rather than develop a detailed critique of each candidate for sus-
pect class status, a more general argument can be formulated: If
alienage qualifies as a suspect class under both the process and the
social model, then many other candidates qualify. Any class involv-
ing the physically or mentally handicapped qualifies in terms of group
identity, harm, and powerlessness. While homosexuals do not have as
immutable characteristics as racial minorities,2 45 the often officially
sanctioned group harm inflicted upon homosexuals would raise them
to a suspect class level. A similar line of reasoning applies to poverty
analysis.246 Within the context of poverty, the Court may come to
recognize newly formed suspect classes such as the homeless, before
the state has to feel the forces of social disruption. Finally, children
and the aged would come under a suspect class heading in the social
242. See supra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
243. See J. ELY, supra note 13, at 148-49.
244. See H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 151
(1988) ("At least the law is now doing much to remove the social stigma with which the
illegitimate child used to be regarded in society.").
245. One way to assess the immutability issue here would be to determine whether or not a
person can plausibly stop being a homosexual by his or her own choice.
246. Cf Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment,
83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (offering a different rationale for protecting the poor):
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model. The transitory nature of these groups should not detract from
judicial concern for the harm inflicted upon them in light of their
relative powerlessness.247
While the social model does provide a more coherent framework
for suspect class analysis than that currently employed by the Court,
the social model still needs to face the charge that the analysis engen-
ders an impractical and unwieldy quagmire in its application. Surely
Justice Rehnquist's admonition248 applies with full force to the social
model: any ingenious lawyer can construct suspect classes at will.
Admittedly, the social model does not provide razor sharp distinc-
tions or bright-line tests, but then no analysis in this area does. The
subject is inherently fuzzy and defies attempts to establish such
bright-lines.
Nevertheless, the social model provides some powerful heuristics
for recognizing those most in need of recognition-those at the bot-
tom of the social hierarchy. In fact, the social model makes stringent
demands: point to a negative, socially constructed identity; construct
a convincing historical narrative describing oppression; and muster
evidence of the harm. Not every social group can meet these
demands. What remains clear is that far more social groups can, and
indeed do, meet these demands than are currently given judicial con-
cern and protection.
V. CONCLUSION
The process model points to the right kind of justification for
suspect class analysis-to a justification within democratic theory-
but adopts a far too restrictive version of democracy. All theories of
democracy, even narrow ones like Schumpeter's competitive elit-
ism,"' make some positive reference to control by "the people." A
democratic theory cannot countenance widespread disparity among
its social groups lest it undermine any meaningful reference to rule by
"the people." Whatever form of rule the particular version of democ-
racy adopts, be it electoral control or widespread popular participa-
tion in governance, that rule presupposes at least a minimum amount
of leveling among the social groups. In order for the theory to be
realized in practice, that leveling must occur.
247. Tribe proposes to treat children and the elderly as semi-suspect classes. L. TRIBE,
supra note 175, at 1588-601. For this classification "there must be an opportunity, absent
strong justification for denying it, for a child to rebut any implied or asserted age-based
incapacity." Id. at 1592.
248. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting
the arbitrary nature of "discrete and insular minorities").
249. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
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The legislative arena occupies but a small, however critical, seg-
ment of the overall democratic playing field. Judicial review operates
as a leveler on the playing field of democracy, assuring some mini-
mum degree of control for and by all of the people. As an amplifier of
the voice of subjugated social groups, the judiciary, far from acting
anti-democratically, acts as a critical protector and promulgator of
democracy when it provides special protection for a wide spectrum of
disadvantaged groups.
Admittedly, in an age when some regard far less judicial activism
than that currently undertaken by the Court as too much, the social
model only exacerbates that perceived problem.25 ° The social model
may be seen as allowing the judiciary too much leeway in imposing its
own substantive values. Yet, can there be any doubt that this occurs
in any case? Carving out a place for judicial protection of suspect
classes in order to counter subjugation promotes substantive values.
The problem is not whether to impose substantive values; the problem
is which values to promote. The key value consists, not in how a par-
ticular judge interprets "the good," but rather, in how the judiciary
protects democracy by countering the forces of subjugation which
threaten to undermine it.
Furthermore, suspect class analysis need not be a tool solely for
the use of the judiciary. A social theory calls for not only judicial, but
also executive, legislative, individual, and institutional activism on
behalf of suspect classes. Indeed, a social theory demands a rethink-
ing of democratic theory and practice.
Ideally, democracy should be blind to social groups. The people
should not come hierarchically ranked. To achieve that ideal, democ-
racy must be highly sensitive to the hierarchy of social groups. Wide
disparity between social groups makes a mockery of "We the people."
To effect a reduction in the gross disparity between social groups, a
pluralist approach needs to be adopted. Pluralism in this context does
not mean a variety of interest groups vying for legislative power.25'
Rather, pluralism implies a multi-faceted attack on the problem of
disadvantaged social groups. The courts should not be the only
guardians of democracy. That is a task worthy of all of our institu-
tions-and of all of us.
250. See supra notes 32 & 99.
251. See S. BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS
OF CRITICAL THEORY 348-49 (1986) (a communitarian sense of pluralism); see also
Michelman, supra note 199, at 1526-28.
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